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THE NEOLIBERAL TURN IN REGIONAL TRADE
AGREEMENTS
James Thuo Gathii*
Abstract: This Article makes two primary arguments. First, that the increased resort to
bilateral and regional trade agreements has taken a neoliberal turn. As such bilateral and
regional trade agreements are now a primary means through which greater investor
protections, commodification of social services, guaranteed rights of investor access to
investment opportunities, privatization of public service goods, and generally the diminution
of sovereign control are being realized. These trade agreements make the foregoing goals
possible not just in developing countries, but in industrialized economies as well. I show that
these agreements provide business interests with opportunities to exercise concerted pressure
to influence the adoption of neoliberal economic policies in both
developed economies and developing economies.
Second, this Article argues that bilateralism and regionalism in trade are contemporary fads
that are spreading neoliberal economic ideals in the periphery of the global trading system. In
other words, emulation by small developing countries of neoliberal economic policies in
developed countries is a significant driver of economic reform. Developing countries adopt
neoliberalism not simply because it is imposed, as many accounts suggest. Rather,
neoliberalism is also voluntarily adopted for a variety of reasons: (i) because there has been a
convergence in the thinking of policymakers and academic thinkers in developing and
developed countries in part as a result of socialization through education or professional
associations and contacts; (ii) as a result of persuasion that neoliberal reforms are important
preconditions for goals such as increased economic growth or the efficiency of public sector
institutions, developing country officials have adopted them; (iii) public officials in
developing countries are strategically adopting neoliberal reforms since they are regarded as
a signaling device that their country is 'safe' for investment or because bilateral and regional
trade agreements come with budget support that is otherwise unavailable to these developing
country officials in their home country; (iv) officials in developing countries are passive
imitators who in the absence of solid evidence as to the efficacy of neoliberal ideals on their
own account or in relation to alternative reform ideas are rationally bounded actors who find
it impractical to assess the efficacy of neoliberal ideals or their alternatives.
In short, this Article argues that the increased number of regional and bilateral trade
agreements represents an important opportunity for the further diffusion of neoliberal
economic ideals, an insight often missing in leading accounts that have emphasized how this
trend conforms or departs from the norms of the World Trade Organization. This paper does
so using a constructivist account of the circumstances under which neoliberalism arises in the
turn towards regionalism and bilateralism. It shows how ideas about market governance and
the institutions and experts that generate and perpetuate these ideas impose an incentive
structure within which choices in favor of neoliberalism are more than less likely to be
exercised.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article argues that the increased resort to bilateral and regional
trade agreements has taken a neoliberal turn. These trade agreements are
now a primary means being used to realize neoliberal economic policies
around the world. These neoliberal policies include trade liberalization,
greater investor protections, commodification of social services,
guaranteed rights of investor access to investment opportunities,
privatization of public service goods, and generally the diminution of
sovereign control over national economies. These trade agreements
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make the spread of neoliberal policies possible not just in developing
countries, but in industrialized economies as well. I show that these
agreements provide business interests with opportunities to exercise
concerted pressure to influence the adoption of neoliberal economic
policies in both developed economies and developing economies.
As such, this Article tells a story of spreading neoliberalism, not only
through the market power of developed economies, or coercion, as this
story has been predominantly told, but also through constructivist
influences.' Constructivism explains the spread of neoliberalism in
regional trade agreements in a number of ways, including the increasing
convergence of business interests with a largely shared set of ideas
supporting market governance in developing and developed countries
that form coalitions to support mutually beneficial agreements. 2 Further,
top government officials in developing countries have increasingly
begun mimicking developed countries' strategies, including the pursuit
of regional and bilateral trade agreements.
This Article therefore differs from leading accounts of the spread of
neoliberalism that primarily or exclusively focus on the role of coercion
to account for the diffusion of neoliberalism.3 It also differs from
accounts put forth by realists and critics of neoliberalism.4 Further, my
approach in this Article differs from the liberal intergovernmentalist
* Associate Dean for Research and Scholarship and Governor George E. Pataki Professor of
International Commercial Law, Albany Law School. Many thanks to Claire Kelly and Nicola
Fernanda for their very insightful comments. Thanks also to the participants of the International
Law Colloquium at Temple Law School, the Global Law and its Exceptions Conference at the
University of Washington School of Law, Seattle, as well as the 4" Trade Policy Research Forum at
the Trade Policy Training Institute in Africa (TRAPCA), in Arusha, Tanzania, for their comments.
George Hanok, Kevin Ramakrishna and Rebecca Fantauzzi provided research assistance.
1. For constructivists' accounts in international law, see generally David J. Bederman,
Constructivism, Positivism, and Empiricism in International Laiw, 89 GEO. L.J. 469 (2001)
(reviewing ANTHONY CLARK AREND, LEGAL RULES AND INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY (1999)); Junta
Brunn6e and Stephen J. Toope, International Lau and Constructivism: Elements of an Interactional
Theory of International Law, 39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 19 (2000); Claire R. Kelly, Realist
Theory and Real Constraints, 44 VA. J. INTL L. 545 (2004); Claire R. Kelly, The Value Vacuum:
Self-Enforcing Regimes and the Dilution of the Normative Feedback Loop, 22 MICH. J. INT'L L. 673
(2000-2001).
2. Other plausible accounts ofneoliberalism in developing countries include "sincere deference to
authority, a culturally appropriate action, or the response to education by the new elite." Andrew
Moravcsik, Bringing Constructivist Integration Theory Out of the Clouds: Has It Landed Yet?, 2
EUR. POL. 219, 237 (2001).
3. Robert 0. Keohane & Lisa L. Martin, The Promise ofInstitutionalist Theory, 20 INT'L SEC. 39
(1995).
4. Realists argue that international institutions and rules mitigate the anarchical nature of
international society. See generally Joseph M. Grieco, Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A
Realist Critique of the Neiwest Liberal Institutionalism, 42 INT'L ORG. 485 (1988).
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approach that focuses on how economic interests, relative power, and the
need for credible commitments alter actors' instrumental calculations.5
The claim here is not that constructivism is a superior explanatory or
causal factor in the diffusion of neoliberalism to the preceding largely
functionalist and rationalist approaches. Rather, the argument is that
constructivism can help account for the circumstances under which
neoliberalism arises in the turn towards regionalism and bilateralism in
trade. It does so by taking into account how ideas about market
governance generated by institutions and experts define the parameters
within which choices in favor of neoliberalism are likely to be exercised.
A constructivist approach therefore supplements functionalist and
rationalist approaches by foregrounding the importance of ideas in the
diffusion of phenomena such as neoliberalism. A constructivist approach
does not focus on donor conditionality or coercion, but instead
highlights that neoliberalism in bilateral and regional trade agreements
may very well be the result of a tactical or strategic policy adjustment.
Proliferation of regionalism and bilateralism may also be a response
to technological or market trends as a consequence of changes in ideas
that were mimicked or voluntarily adopted, because the mimickers came
to believe them and began changing their economic goals and policies
accordingly.6  Simply put, constructivism helps to explain how
socialization into new norms and ideas influences both governmental
policies and behavior. The increasing use of regional trade agreements
serves as a good case study of such constructivism. Finally, this Article
differs from other accounts of the proliferation of bilateral and regional
trade agreements by seeking to examine whether these agreements are
building or stumbling blocks to multilateral trade. 8
This Article shows that free trade agreements (FTAs) and bilateral
investment agreements include treaty commitments in areas such as
5. See ANDREW MORAVCSIK, THE CHOICE FOR EUROPE: SOCIAL PURPOSE AND STATE POWER
FROM MESSINA TO MAASTRICHT (1998).
6. In other words, the claim is not that constructivism itself is a binding constraint on policy. This
is not to overstate the possibility that political behavior is not always consistent with stated
principled justifications. See ROBERT PUTNAM, THE BELIEFS OF POLITICIANS: IDEOLOGY,
CONFLICT, AND DEMOCRACY IN BRITAIN AND ITALY (1973).
7. Notably, even critics of constructivism agree that European Union (EU) integration has been
linked to neoliberal ideology. See Moravcsik, supra note 2, at 230. Notably, Moravcsik approvingly
quotes Checkel: "Can one really disentangle preference change driven by persuasion and
socialization from strategic adaptation in the face of changed incentives, or from passive,
cognitively simplifying imitation?" Id. at 232.
8. See generally James Thuo Gathii, African Regional Trade Agreements as Flexible Legal
Regimes, 35 N.C. J. INTL L. & COM. REG. 571 (2010) (discussing the arguments over whether
regional trade agreements are building or stumbling blocks but not drawing any conclusions).
[Vol. 86:421
HeinOnline  -- 86 Wash. L. Rev. 424 2011
NEOLIBERAL TURN IN RTAs
government procurement and investor protection that provide a foothold
for U.S. investors in signatory countries that are otherwise unavailable in
the World Trade Organization (WTO). In addition, these FTAs
incorporate heightened intellectual property rights protection and
financial liberalization commitments which go beyond the treaty
commitments contained in the WTO's Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Policy (TRIPS).
Regional and bilateral trade agreements adopt many of the elements
of the Washington Consensus of economic reform for development 9 that
have had several consequences. First, developing country signatory
states assume enhanced obligations to protect the rights of foreign
investors-a role that often creates enormous tensions with their role as
guardians of their citizens. 10 By adopting many elements of the
Washington Consensus, these agreements open markets in developing
countries to transnational corporations that, in essence, become
providers of social services, including education, health, water,
electricity, garbage collection, and disposal. As a result, these
agreements help to commoditize and make social services tradable
opportunities for which foreign investors can compete."' Signatory
countries to bilateral and regional trade agreements as well as bilateral
investment treaties gain access to a market of tradable services. These
treaties guarantee investors the non-discrimination rights of most
favored nations as well as national treatment, transparency, and the right
to arbitration over any dispute covered by the agreements. 12 Further,
9. Washington Consensus refers to the summation of reforms summarized by John Williamson in
1989 that came to be widely accepted at the time and were being undertaken in Latin America
before being adopted elsewhere. See John Williamson, Peterson Inst. for int'l Econ., Outline of
Speech at the Center for Strategic & International Studies: Did the Washington Consensus Fail?
(Nov. 6, 2002), http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/paper.cfm?researchid-488. The three
overarching ideas were: macro-economic discipline, a market economy, and openness to the world
in respect to trade and foreign direct investment. Id. Williamson also presented a list often specific
policy prescriptions: fiscal discipline, particularly by reducing large deficits and balance of
payments as high inflation; reordering public expenditure policies; tax reform; liberalizing interest
rates; a competitive exchange rate; trade liberalization; liberalization of inward foreign direct
investment; privatization; deregulation; and strong property rights regimes. Id
10. See generally Joel Ngugi, Making Neu, Wine for Old Wineskins: Can the Reform of
International Law Emancipate the Third World in the Age of Globalization?, 8 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L
L. & POL'Y 73 (2002).
11. See Poverty Reduction and Econ. Mgmt. Afr. Region, Africa's Trade in Services and
Economic Partnership Agreements Report No. 55747-AFR, WORLD BANK (July 20, 2010),
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTAFRREGTOPTRADE/Resources/AfricaTradeinServicesand
EPAsNEW.pdf
12. See JAMES Ti-Uo GATHII, WAR, COMMERCE, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 191-200 (2009)
(discussing conflict over tradable resources resulting in privatized war because of market access for
2011]
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because services are provided through the market rather than through the
state, the public becomes less able to hold governments accountable
when they do not provide quality, affordable, and accessible services. As
a consequence, these agreements reach "deep behind the border[s of
developing countries], guaranteeing rights of entry and commercial
operation to foreign services firms and imposing market disciplines on
the policy and regulatory choices of national governments.',
13
The turn to regional FTAs also makes it much easier to bully smaller
groups of countries to commit to the objectives of the Washington
Consensus or neoliberal economic restructuring than it would be through
arduous multilateral trade negotiations at the WTO. Notably, however,
the aggressive unilateralism of bilateral and regional trade agreements
has not always assured victory for big countries. 14 This Article shows in
Part III that the United States has been unable to conclude a full-fledged
free trade agreement with the Southern African Customs Union (SACU),
which objected to many of the commitments the United States proposed.
In addition, as already noted above, many developing countries
committed themselves to pursuing bilateral and regional trade
agreements to promote their interests in very much the same way that
developed economies have. In so doing, they have mimicked the turn to
bilateralism and regionalism pursued by the major trading partners by
changing their policies and preferences in trade among themselves as
well as with major trading partners.
Part I outlines the standard justifications in favor of bilateralism and
regionalism in trade and the long litany of such agreements entered into
by the United States and the European Union (EU). This Part will also
discuss the Model Agreements used by the United States and the EU and
the type of commitments contained in them.
Part II examines the primarily rationalist reasons for the unmistakable
spike in bilateralism and regionalism in the recent past, including forum
shifting, 5 and describes how the turn to regionalism has affected
the goods).
13. Jane Kelsey, Confr-onting Trade-Related Human Rights in a GATS-Compatible World, L.
SOC. JUST. & GLOBAL DEV., 1,3 Dec. 6, 2007), available at
http://www.go.warwick.ac.uk/elj/lgd/2007 _/kelsey.
14. In fact, statistical evidence suggests as much. See Ka Zeng, Trade Structure and the
Effectiveness of America's "Aggressively Unilateral" Trade Policy, 46 INT'L STUD. Q. 93 (2002)
(explaining possible reasons for the United States' "uneven success" in gaining concessions from
bargaining partner).
15. See Peter Drahos, Four Lessons for Developing Countries From the Trade Negotiations Over
Access to Medicines, 28 LIVERPOOL L. REV. 11, 33 (2007) ("Essentially it allows [a country] to
increase its opportunities to play for a win by not confining the pursuit of its negotiating agenda to
[Vol. 86:421
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developing countries' abilities to build coalitions around trade
negotiations. This Part also examines another important reason for the
spread of bilateralism and regionalism-constructivism. It discusses
diffusion, mimicry, and competition for resources and markets as other
reasons for the spread of bilateralism.
Finally, Part III examines how the types of commitments being
included in bilateral and regional trade agreements fortify the agenda of
the Washington Consensus with specific examples from the Economic
Partnership Agreement (EPA) between the Caribbean Forum
(CARIFORUM) and the European Community (EC), 16 as well as the
U.S.-Morocco FTA of 2003. This Part also contrasts the failure of the
U.S.-SACU FTA with the recently concluded and ratified U.S.-South
Korea FTA.
I. THE TREND TOWARD TRADE REGIONALISM AND
BILATERALISM
This section traces the trend towards regional and bilateral trade
agreements. It shows this trend demonstrates a marked change-with
more emphasis placed on regional and bilateral trade agreements than on
multilateral trade negotiations through the WTO. As the graphic
illustration from the WTO shows, this trend started accelerating in the
early 1990s. In the early part of the twenty-first century as WTO
negotiations faltered, this upward trend in bilateral and regional trade
agreements continued.
A. The Long Litany of U.S. Regional and Bilateral Trade and
Investment Agreements
One of the first bipartisan standing ovations that President Obama
received in his 2010 State of the Union address was for his declaration
that the United States was committed to pursuing trade agreements with
other countries. 17 Such agreements, he noted, would create jobs for
one international forum.").
16. The sixteen members are Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Cuba,
Dominica, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint
Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago. List of Caribbean
Community (CARICOM) Member States, OFF. OF TRADE NEGOTIATIONS,
http://www.crnm.org/index.php?option com simplelists&view simplelist&layout--basic&category
id 81&ltemid=141 (last visited Aug. 11, 2011).
17. See Barack Obama, President of the U.S., State of the Union Address (Jan. 27, 2010),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-state-union-address [hereinafter
2010 State of the Union Address].
2011]
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Americans and opportunities for U.S. exporters. 18 Similarly, in the 2011
State of the Union address, President Obama urged Congress to pass
trade deals his administration had signed with India, China, and South
Korea.1 9 He said, to further bipartisan applause, that he was determined
to continue pursuing trade agreements with Panama, Colombia, and with
the Asia-Pacific region.20 President Obama, like many former presidents,
has made it a goal to export more American goods-which the President
wants to double in the next five years-as a central pillar of his job
creation strategy.2 ' In fact, trade agreements are part of President
Obama's plan to create two million jobs under a National Export
Initiative to "help farmers and small businesses increase their exports
and reform export controls consistent with national security. 22
Related to this, the President also announced that the United States
must "seek new markets aggressively," just as its competitors are
doing.23 As he put it, "[i]f America sits on the sidelines while other
nations sign trade deals, we will lose the chance to create jobs on our
shores. 24 President Obama further argued in favor of "enforcing those
[trade] agreements so our trading partners play by the rules. 2 5 He
argued that the administration was continuing to "shape a Doha trade
agreement that opens global markets," as well as to "strengthen our trade
relations in Asia and with key partners like South Korea and Panama and
18. See id. President Obama outlined this strategy in an address to his Export Council. See
Remarks Prior to a Meeting with the President's Export Council, 2010 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC.
(Dec. 9, 2010), available at http://origin.www.gpo.gov /fdsys/pkg/DCPD-201001055 /pdf/DCPD-
201001055.pdf (where the President referred back to his 2010 State of the Union address promising
to open foreign markets for U.S. products and to create jobs for U.S. workers). The Export Council
had outlined a strategy for improving U.S. exports that included entering into more trade
agreements that would open foreign markets. See EXPORT PROMOTION CABINET, REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT ON THE NATIONAL EXPORT INITIATIVE: THE EXPORT PROMOTION CABNETS PLAN FOR
DOUBLING U.S. EXPORTS IN FIVE YEARS (Sept. 10, 2010), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/nei report 9-16-10 full.pdf.
19. See Barack Obama, President of the U.S., State of the Union Address (Jan. 25, 2011),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/01/25/remarks-president-state-union-address.
20. Id.
21. See 2010 State of the Union Address, supra note 18.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Jd; see also Richard E. Baldwin, A Domino Theory of Regionalism, in EXPANDING
MEMBERSHIP IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 25 (Richard E. Baldwin et al. eds, 1995) (advancing the
competitive liberalization hypothesis to account for the increased spread of regional and bilateral
trade agreements and advancing a domino theory to account for the increased spread of regionalism
and bilateralism).
25. 2010 State of the Union Address, supra note 18.
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Colombia. (Applause.),, 26
None of these proposals was new. The Obama administration's trade
policy in many respects continues the trade policy of previous
administrations. Notably, on December 14, 2009, the United States
Trade Representative (USTR) notified Congress of the Obama
administration's intention to negotiate a Trans-Pacific Partnership
Agreement (TPP). 2' This agreement, the USTR argued, represents a
"new kind of trade agreement for the 21st century. ' 28 As this
announcement shows, the Obama administration is carrying forward the
recent U.S. policy of market opening and job creation through regional
and bilateral free trade agreements. Initiatives such as the TPP are not
surprising-for at least a decade, pursuing such objectives at the
WTOhas not been very successful. 29 The deadlock in multilateral trade
negotiations has made bilateral and regional agreements more viable
alternatives.30
The United States and the EU increasingly use regionalism and
bilateralism as important avenues for consolidating and implementing
their respective trade agendas. 31 However, the trend towards regionalism
and bilateralism in trade has expanded beyond these big economies 2
Developing economies are also feverishly negotiating these agreements.
For example, the SACU, which comprises South Africa, Botswana, and
26. Id.
27. See TPP Statements and Actions to Date, OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/fact-sheets/2009/december/tpp-statements-and-actions-
date (last visited Aug. 31, 2011); see also Economic Opportunities and the TPP, OFF. U.S. TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/fact-sheets/2009/december/economic-
opportunities-and-tpp (last visited Aug. 28, 2011 ).
28. Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Trans-Pacific Partnership
Announcement (Dec. 14, 2009), http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-
releases/2009/december/trans-pacific-partnership-announcement.
29. See C. O'Neal Taylor, The U.S. Approach to Regionalism: Recent Past and Future, 15 ILSA
J. INT'L & COMP. L. 411,417 (2009).
30. For more discussion on the shift to bilateral and regional trade agreements, see infra Part 11.
31. See Taylor, supra note 29, at 418.
32. There is substantial literature on whether regional blocs are a stumbling block for global trade
integration. See Jagdish Bhagwati, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM AT RISK (1991); see also Jagdish
Bhagwati, U.S. Trade Policy: The Infatuation With Free Trade Areas, in THE DANGEROUS DRIFT
TO PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 1 (Jagdish Bhagwati & Anne 0. Krueger eds., 1995);
Jagdish Bhagwati, David Greenaway & Arvind Panagariya, Trading Preferentially: Theory and
Policy, 108 ECON. J. 1128, 1138 (1998); Arvind Panagariya, Preferential Trade Liberalization: The
Traditional Theory and New Developments, 38 J. ECON. LITERATURE 287, 328 (2000); Consultative
Board to the Director-General, The Future of the WTO: Addressing Institutional Challenges in the
New Millennium (2004), available at
http://www.wto.org/English/thewto e/10anniv e/future wto e.pdf
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three of the poorest economies in southern Africa-Lesotho, Namibia,
and Swaziland-signed a European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA) with
Norway, Iceland, and Switzerland/Liechtenstein in 2006;33 the Mercado
Comn del Sur (MERCOSUR), a Preferential Trade Agreement, with
Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay in 2004;34 a Trade,
Investment, and Development Cooperation Agreement (TIDCA) with
the United States in 2008;35 and is currently negotiating a FTA with
India.36 The WTO Committee on Regional Trade Agreements reports
that as of October 15, 2009, "457 regional trade agreements (RTAs),
counting goods and services notifications separately, have been notified
to the GATT/WTO, 266 of which are currently in force. 3 7
This section outlines and discusses the proliferation of bilateral and
regional trade and investment agreements such as the ones discussed
above. The number of these agreements entered into in the last few years
demonstrates a preference for regional and bilateral trade agreements
over multilateral trade agreements. This section also shows the broad
range of areas that are covered by these agreements.
1. Bilateral Trade Agreements
Currently, the United States has FTAs in effect with seventeen
nations. 38 Of these, eleven FTAs are bilateral agreements. 39 The United
States also has free trade agreements with regional blocs, including the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the U.S.-Central
America-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR).40
The first bilateral FTA, between the United States and Israel, went
into effect in 1985.41 This was followed, over fifteen years later, by the
U.S.-Jordan bilateral agreement, which became effective in 2001.42 The
33. Bi-lateral Trade Negotiations, S. AFR. CUSTOMS UNION,
http://www.sacu.int/traden.php?id-414 (last visited Aug. 11,2011).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, Report (2009) of the Committee on Regional
Trade Agreements to the General Council, WT/REG/20 (Oct. 16, 2009).
38. List of U.S. Free Trade Agreements, OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements (last visited Aug. 12, 2011).
39. Id. (Australia, Bahrain, Chile, Columbia, Israel, Jordan, Morocco, Oman, Panama, Peru, and
Singapore).
40. See id.
41. Overview of the Israel Free Trade Agreement, OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/israel-fta (last visited July 17, 2011).
42. Overview of the Jordan Free Trade Agreement, OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
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United States entered into more FTAs with countries such as Singapore
and Chile in 2004, Australia in 2005, Morocco and Bahrain in 2006,"3
and Peru44 and Oman in 2009. .
The United States has also signed free trade agreements with several
countries-agreements that Congress has yet to ratify.46 These unratified
agreements include an FTA with Colombia (2006), South Korea
(initially concluded in 2007 but eventually ratified by Congress and
signed by the President in October 2011), and Panama (2007). 7 The
United States concluded negotiations on the South Korean FTA in early
December 2010. 48 It initiated, but later suspended, negotiations with
Thailand.49 Continuing negotiations are underway with Malaysia, the
United Arab Emirates, and the SACU. 5 °
http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/jordan-fta (last visited July 17, 2011);
The U.S. Jordan Free Trade Agreement Fact Sheet, SUKHTIAN.COM,
http://www.sukhtian.com/uploads/factsheet.pdf (last visited Sept. 19, 2011 ).
43. Summary of U.S. Free Trade Agreements, U.S. DEPT OF STATE,
http://www.state.gov/e/eeb/tpp/bta/fta/c26474.htm (last visited Sept. 21, 2011).
44. Overview of Peru Free Trade Promotion Agreement, OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/peru-tpa (last visited Sept. 21, 2011).
45. Overview of Oman Free Trade Agreement, OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/oman-fta (last visited Sept. 21, 2011).
46. List of U.S. Free Trade Agreements, supra note 38 ("The United States has signed free trade
agreements with Colombia, Korea, and Panama, but Congress must enact legislation to approve and
implement each individual agreement in order for them to go into effect."). President Obama sent
these agreements to Congress for votes in early October 2011 and votes are expected on them
before the end of the month in the Senate. See Len Braken, Reid, Daley Eye Oct. 12 Trade Deal
Votes; House Rules, Senate Finance Acts Pave Way, INT'L TRADE REPORTER ONLINE (BNA)
(Oct. 6, 2011), available at
http://news.bna.com/itln/lpages/lpages.adppg breaking news&bnjprod uct itln# urn:bna: a0c9g3 q0
x8. Congress eventually voted on the Agreements in mid-October 2011 and on Friday October 21,
2011, President Obama signed them into law. See Tom Devaney, Obana Signs Free-Trade Pacts,
WASH. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2011), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011 /oct/21 /obama-signs-
free-trade-pacts.
47. See supra note 46.
48. Julie Pace & Ken Thomas, Obama Hails S. Korea Trade Deal as Victory for US Workers,
ABC NEWS (Dec. 4, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/Business/wireStory?id 12313653.
49. Overview of U.S. Trade with Thailand, OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
http://www.ustr.gov/countries-regions/southeast-asia-pacific/thailand (last visited Sept. 19, 2011).
50. Trade Agreement Advisory Services, THE ALL AM. SMALL BUS. ExP. ASS'N,
http://aasbea.com/portal/index.php/international (last visited Sept. 19, 2011 ). The President's Export
Council has made it an objective to "[u]se bilateral trade policy mechanisms to expand market-
opening opportunities. Bilateral trade policy mechanisms, such as FTAs, Trade and Investment
Framework Agreements, Joint Committees on Trade and Investment, and Bilateral Consultative
Mechanisms, can be used to create new market opportunities with other key trading partners."
EXPORT PROMOTION CABINET, supra note 18.
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2. Regional Initiatives
In addition to pursuing bilateral trade agreements, the United States
has entered into regional trade agreements including: the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations, (ASEAN), Trade and Investment Framework
Agreement, which was concluded in 2006; the U.S. Trans-Pacific
Partnership (TPP) FTA, which is currently under re-negotiation; the
CAFTA-DR FTA, which has been in effect since 2004 between the
United States and El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua,
Dominican Republic, and Costa Rica;5' and NAFTA, which has been in
effect since 1994 between Canada, Mexico, and the United States.52
3. Trade and Investment Framework Agreements (TIFAs)
The United States also has forty-four trade and investment framework
agreements: eleven in Africa; fifteen in Europe and the Middle East; five
in South and Central Asia; nine in Southeast Asia; and four in the
Americas.53 According to the United States Trade Representative, TIFAs
"provide strategic frameworks and principles for dialogue on trade and
investment issues between the United States and the other parties to the
TIFA. ',54 They also establish a framework for consultations and
cooperation with a view to enhancing opportunities for trade and
investment 5
4. Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs)
The United States also signs BITs to guarantee U.S. investors
favorable terms and conditions for private investment under international
law. BITs guarantee fair and equitable treatment for investors, protect
against discriminatory treatment and expropriation, and ensure investor
dispute settlement through international arbitration.56 Currently, the
51. Overview of the Dominican Republic-Central America FTA (CAFTA), OFF. U.S. TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE, http://www. ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/cafta-dr-dominican-
republic-central-america-fta (last visited Sept. 21, 2011).
52. Overview of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), OFF. U.S. TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/north-american-
free-trade-agreement-nafta (last visited Sept. 21, 2011).
53. See Trade & Investment Frameiwork Agreements, OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/trade-investment-framework-agreements (last visited July 17,
2011).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Overview of the U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaty Program, OFF. U.S. TRADE
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United States has BITs with forty nations.57
5. Model Agreements
The United States has varying model FTAs and a Model BIT.58
Unlike NAFTA, the U.S. FTA models have extensive obligations while
also extending trade rules to many new areas not covered in any WTO
treaty. 59 The obligations included in a typical U.S. Model FTA cover a
broad range of areas including national treatment and market access for
goods, general rules of origin, sector specific rules of origin, customs
procedures, agriculture, standards, trade measures, government
procurement, investment, services, competition policy, temporary entry,
and intellectual property rights.60
While NAFTA was primarily intended to liberalize trade in goods,
today's U.S. FTAs go beyond that. For example, they impose extensive
obligations in areas such as trade in services, as well as obligations in
areas that developing countries have blocked at the WTO, such as
government procurement and competition policy. 6 1 For this reason, these
trade treaties are designed to advance economic reforms such as
liberalization, deregulation and privatization that favor U.S. business
interests and consumers in the countries that sign them. As some
commentators have noted, BITs in particular are more like "Bills of
Rights" for foreign investors that guarantee rights of access and due
process rights in signatory countries that are backed by binding
62international arbitration. BIT and FTA negotiations increasingly cover
REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/bilateral-investment-treaties (last visited
Sept. 19,2011).
57. See Index of U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaties, TRADE COMPLIANCE CTR.,
http://tcc.export.gov/Trade Agreements/Bilateral-Investment Treaties/index.asp (last visited July
17,2011).
58. See Model U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaty, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE (2004),
http: //www.state.gov/documents/organization/ 117601 .pdf; Testimony Regarding the Proposed
United States Trans-Pacific Partnership Free Trade Agreement, PUB. CITIZEN (Mar. 4, 2009),
http://www.citizen.org/documents/TPPFTACommentsFinalI.pdf: see also generally C. O'Neal
Taylor, Of Free Trade Agreements and Models, 19 IND. INT'L & COMp. L. REV. 569 (2009)
(discussing the U.S. model free trade agreement). On the use of NAFTA as a model for subsequent
FTAs and their variation, see David Gantz, The Evolution of FTA Investment Provisions: From
NAFTA to the United States - Chile Free Trade Agreement, 19 AM. U. INTL L. REV. 679 (2004).
59. See Taylor, supra note 58.
60. Id. at 585-86.
61. See Martin Khor, Developing Countries Resist WTO Agreement on 'Competition Policy,'
THIRD WORLD NETWORK (Apr. 1999), http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/I 889-cn.htm.
62. Jose E. Alvarez, North American Free Trade Agreement's Chapter Eleven, 28 U. MIAMI
INTER-AM. L. REV. 303, 308 (1997); see also id at 304 (arguing that NAFTA is a "bilateral
201 1]
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the same subject matter. For example, a typical U.S. FTA includes
63provisions for investment protection. The convergence of BITS and
FTAs is helping the EU and United States to defragment the distinctions
between trade and investment and create stronger rights and protections
for investors.
B. Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) and the EU's Global
Europe Strategy
The EU has also taken significant steps to protect its economic
interests with other nations through regional and bilateral trade
agreements. The current negotiations on EPAs with African, Caribbean,
and Pacific (ACP) States exemplify this quite well. 64 The EU's agenda is
embodied in the October 2006 Global Europe Strategy. The primary
goal of this strategy is to make Europe more competitive by giving "a
sharper focus on market opening and stronger rules in new trade areas of
economic importance to the [EU], notably intellectual property, services,
investment, public procurement and competition., 65 In this strategy, the
EU declared the need for comprehensive trade agreements that would
uphold the need to protect the competitiveness of EU's markets while
safeguarding EU export interests through tariffs and non-tariff barriers.
66
These objectives are more recently reflected in the EU's 2020
67Strategy. This strategy argues that "the EU will require a stronger
investment treaty on steroids"). This theme is further echoed in PHILIPPE SANDS, LAWLESS WORLD:
AMERICA AND THE MAKING AND BREAKING OF GLOBAL RULES FROM FDR's ATLANTIC CHARTER
TO GEORGE W. BUSH'S ILLEGAL WAR 117-42 (2005) (noting the tendency to interpret international
investment rules in isolation of other international law rules and to give priority to investor rights
over rules that protect human rights and the environment).
63. See Taylor, supra note 58, at 592.
64. EPA negotiations were triggered by article 36 of the Cotonou Agreement, a partnership
agreement between the EU and African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) states, following a decision
of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body requiring these parties to negotiate WTO compliant trade
agreements. See Agreement Amending for the Second Time the Partnership Agreement Between the
Members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States, of the One Part, and the European
Community and Its Member States, of the Other Part, Mar. 19, 2010, 2010 O.J. (L 287) 3, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.douri=OJ:L:2010:287:0003:0049:EN:PDF [hereinafter
Cotonou Agreement].
65. Trade Policy Review Body, Report by the European Communities, WT/TPR/G/177, at 10 11
(Jan. 22, 2007), http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr e/g177_e.doc.
66. See Global Europe: Competing in the World, EUROPEAN COMM'N, 2 (2006),
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/october/tradoc 130376.pdf [hereinafter Global Europe
Strategy].
67. See European Commission, Trade Policy as a Core Component of the EU s 2020 Strategy,
COM (2010) 612 final (Nov. 9, 2010).
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export orientation" to create more growth and jobs. 68 This strategy
makes the case for a strong and positive link between trade and growth.
The European Commission gives several reasons for this linkage:
First, [trade] openness enhances efficient resource allocation. It
creates incentives for capital and labour to be put to work in
areas with the highest return. Second, trade facilitates the
dissemination of knowledge and innovations embodied in goods,
services and investments. Third, open trade encourages
competition and thereby provides an incentive to supply the best
quality/price ratio of goods to consumers and to increase
productivity. Fourth, opening up trade gives producers access to
larger markets and hence, the possibility to reap the benefits of
increasing returns to scale and specialisation.6 9
In short, the EU attributes to trade opening three critical benefits:
economic growth, consumer benefits, and employment. 70
The EU's economic partnership agreements are similar to the typical
U.S. Model FTA in a number of respects. While the United States has a
greater interest in using trade agreements to advance its foreign policy
and national security goals,71  the EU primarily uses regional and
bilateral trade agreements to protect its economy and advance the
competiveness of its industries in the global market. 2 Accordingly, the
EU arguably takes for granted that its "commercial interests correspond
to the development needs" of the countries with which it signs bilateral
68. European Commission Staff, Trade as a Driver of Prosperity, at 4, SEC (2010) 1269.
69. Id. at 8-9.
70. This 2020 Strategy is a continuation of the EU's trade agenda embodied in the October 2006
Global Europe Strategy. The primary goal of the Global Europe Strategy was to make Europe more
competitive by giving "a sharper focus on market opening and stronger rules in new trade areas of
economic importance to the [EU], notably intellectual property (IPR), services, investment, public
procurement and competition." Report by the European Communities, Trade Policy Review, 11,
WT/TPR/G/177 (Jan. 22, 2007). In this Strategy, the EU declared the need for comprehensive trade
agreements that would uphold the need to protect the competitiveness of the EU's markets while
safeguarding EU export interests through tariffs and non-tariff barriers. See Global Europe Strategy,
supra note 66.
71. See, e.g., The U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement: Securing Economic Groith and
American Leadership, BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE (Sept. 7, 2011),
http://businessroundtable.org/studies-and-reports/the-u.s.-colombia-free-trade-agreement-securing-
economic-growth-and-america.
72. See JANE KELSEY, S. CTR., RESEARCH PAPER No. 31, LEGAL ANALYSIS OF SERVICES AND
INVESTMENT IN THE CARIFORUM-EC EPA: LESSONS FOR OTHER DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
(July 2010),
http://www.southcentre.org/index.php?option-com docman&task-docdownload&gid- 1860&lte
mid 182&lang-en.
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or regional agreements.73 The EC is currently negotiating with or has
interim agreements with several of the ACP countries, but currently only
has a comprehensive EPA with the CARIFORUM countries, a
Caribbean regional group of fifteen full member countries.7 4 This
CARIFORUM-EC EPA is the first trade agreement that has been
concluded using the template approved by the Council of Europe and
therefore is an example of the model that the EU will use in similar
agreements.
Some key elements of the CARIFORUM EPA include: member
nations agreed to liberalize 86.9% of imports from the EU within 25
yearsI82.7% within the first fifteen years- when prior to the
agreement, only 51% of EU imports were duty free; member nations will
be given a transition period of up to twenty-five years on some products,
and can use a general moratorium for the first three years of the
agreement; CARIFORUM nations can maintain other duties and charges
for up to seven years of the agreement, before they must phase them out
during the subsequent three years; "regional preference" will extend any
concession granted to one country to all member countries; and finally,
the EU will liberalize 94% of its services sector, CARIFORUM
countries will liberalize 75%, and least developed countries (LDC) will
liberalize 65 %.
76
The CARIFORUM EPA has been held out as a "Trade Partnership for
Sustainable Development"Iemphasizing its objective to be consistent
with using scarce resources in a manner that they will be available for
future generations. There are reasons to doubt that the CARIFORUM
EPA will promote sustainable development, discussed further below.
73. Id. at 32; see also Global Europe Strategy, supra note 70, at 12 ("We will also take into
account the development needs of our partners and the potential impact of any agreement on other
developing countries, in particular the potential effects on poor countries' preferential access to EU
markets. The possible impact on development should be included as part of the overall impact
assessment that will be conducted before deciding to launch FTA negotiations. In line with our
position in the WTO, we will encourage our FTA partners to facilitate access by least-developed
countries to their market, if possible by granting duty and quota free access.").
74. See Overview of EPA State of Play, EUROPEAN COMM'N (Feb. 5, 2010),
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2009/september/tradoc 144912.pdf.
75. See KELSEY, supra note 72, at i, iv, ix, 1.
76. Errol Humphrey, Ambassador of Barb. & Vice-Dean of the CARIFORUM College of EPA
Negotiators, Presentation at the DG Trade-Organized Workshop in Brussels: CARIFORUM EPA
Negotiations: Initial Reflections on the Outcome (Feb. 13, 2008),
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2008/april (follow "tradoc 138606.pdf ' hyperlink).
77. Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, Tailoring IP Protection for Sustainable Development: An
Examination of the CARIFORUM EPA, TRADE NEGOTIATIONS INSIGHTS 10 (Eur. Ctr. for Dev.
Policy Mgmt. and Int'l Ctr. for Trade and Sustainable Dev.) (Nov. 2010), available at
http://ictsd.org/i/news/tni/94176/.
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The EU's Model EPAs contain similar elements to the U.S. Model
FTA. However, the EU's model is viewed as less radical than the U.S.
template. "[F]or example, the [United States] insists on a negative list
approach to schedules of commitments, listing sectors and measures that
are excluded, and on the inclusion of investment expropriation
provisions that can be enforced through investor-initiated arbitration. ' '78
This type of a schedule system makes certain that all new services will
be covered automatically, excluding only those that have been
specifically excluded. The EU, on the other hand, takes a "positive list
approach" that details specific sectors for commitments. 79 This allows
the EU to implement new sectors according to the agreement and does
not automatically include sectors not explicitly enumerated.
1. Choice of Countries/Regions
Countries chosen by the United States and EU for regional and
bilateral agreements are generally those with which they have a trade
surplus-countries over which they exercise great market power.80 Thus,
the United States and EU can use this advantage to influence the
direction of negotiations and commitments entered into in the
agreements. The best example of such an agreement is the U.S.-
Morocco FTA-which was promoted by the Bush administration as a
yardstick for future negotiations.8 1 The U.S.-Morocco FTA is discussed
further in Part III below. The converse is also true: the U.S. Congress
seems hesitant to accept trade agreements with nations to whom the
United States is indebted. An example of this is the U.S.-Korea FTA,
which had been caught up in a stalemate in Congress for quite some
time; in late 2010 there was a breakthrough, but the agreement has yet to
receive congressional approval.82
78. KELSEY, supra note 72, at 2.
79. Id. at 25.
80. Notably, market power may not always be determinative. On this, see discussion of the failed
U.S. SACU FTA, infra Part 111; see also Christina L. Davis, Do WTO Rules Create a Level Playing
Field? Lessons from the Experience of Peru and Vietnam, in NEGOTIATING TRADE: DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES IN THE WTO AND NAFTA 219, 219 (John S. Odell ed., 2006).
81. Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, U.S. and Morocco Conclude Free
Trade Agreement (Mar. 2004), available at http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-
releases/archives/2004/march/us-and-morocco-conclude-free-trade-agreemen (noting that the
agreement was a vital step in expanding the network of U.S. FTAs in the Middle East and North
Africa); see also Overview of the Morocco Free Trade Agreement, OFF. U.S. TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/morocco-fta (last
visited Oct. 19, 2011).
82. See Overview of the Korea U.S. Free Trade Agreement, OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
2011]
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The United States and the EU also have a much easier time
negotiating trade agreements with countries that are dependent on their
economies as export markets. These large economies can exercise their
market power to extract concessions from countries with an interest in
maintaining or gaining access to their large market. By contrast, it is
harder for these large economies to negotiate trade treaties with
countries that have a trade surplus in these large economies, because
neither the United States nor the EU can exercise the same amount of
market power against such economies. South Korea has a trade surplus
in both the EU and the United States. The EU has nevertheless signed a
free trade deal with South Korea, even though it "runs a deficit with
South Korea in goods trade. 84 The EU was only able to sign the
agreement after securing a concession to place a safeguard clause
allowing it to take emergency measures if increased imports from South
Korea would "cause serious injury, or threat thereof, to the domestic
industry. 85 Therefore, even though the EU agreed to sign a free trade
agreement with a country with which it has a deficit, it used its
negotiating experience to its advantage.
I. ACCOUNTING FOR THE TURN TO REGIONAL AND
BILATERAL TRADE AGREEMENTS
This section examines the reasons that account for the unmistakable
commitment among major trading powers like the United States and the
http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/korus-fa (last visited July 17, 2011);
see also Overview of Trade with Korea, OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
http://www.ustr.gov/countries-regions/japan-korea-apec/korea (last visited July 17, 2011) (detailing
U.S. goods trade deficit with Korea to be $10 billion in 2009); U.S. Senate Breakthrough for Trade
Agreements iwith Korea, Colombia, and Panama, MERCOPRESS (Aug. 4, 2011),
http://en.mercopress.com/2011/08/04/us-senate-breakthrough-for-trade-agreements-with-korea-
colombia-and-panama; Pace & Thomas, supra note 48.
83. This Article does not intend to undermine the well established phenomenon that large trading
countries tend to enter into bilateral and regional trade agreements with other large trading
countries, particularly those that are geographically proximate. See Scott L. Baier et al., Do
Economic Integration Agreements Really Work2 Issues in Understanding Causes and
Consequences of the Growth of Regionalism, 31 WORLD ECON. 461, 492-93 (2008).
84. See Press Release, Eur. Comm'n, EU and South Korea Sign Free Trade Deal (Oct. 6, 2010),
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id-626.
85. Free Trade Agreement, EU-S. Kor., art. 3, Oct. 6, 2010, 2011 O.J. (L 127) 6, http:/eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri-OJ:L:2011:127:0006:1343:EN:PDF. Safeguard acts
are a mechanism created under GATT, art. XIX, under which a WTO member may take action to
protect specific industries from any imported product or products that are causing, or threaten to
cause, serious iniury to an industry. See Safeguard Measures, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/safeg e/safeg e.htm (last visited July 21, 2011).
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EU to turn to regional trade agreements. These reasons include the
failure of multilateral trade negotiations where developing and
developed countries are locked in an impasse in part because of their
conflicting priorities. It is notable that Brazil, Russia, India, and China
have not been left out of this trend; some of their bilateral and regional
trade initiatives are referred to below. 8 6 Before delving into these issues,
this part of the Article will first examine standard justifications for
regional and bilateral trade agreements.
A. Standard Justifications for Regionalism and Bilateralism
Emphasize the Benefits to Developing Countries
Traditional arguments used to justify the shift to regionalism and
bilateralism focus on ease of implementation because of geographical
location; cultural and political proximity and their compatibility with the
rules of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the WTO.
These arguments8 7 do not adequately explain the current accelerated
trend towards trade regionalism and bilateralism. 8 This section briefly
outlines some of these traditional justifications in favor of trade
regionalism and bilateralism to provide some background context
against which to appreciate the immediate reasons for the spike in
regional and bilateral trade agreements.8 9
There are three traditional justifications for bilateral and regional
trade agreements. First, some argue that bilateral and regional trade
agreements are easier to create and implement than multilateral
agreements because great geographical differences between various
regions can make global cooperation extremely complicated.90 Countries
86. For more on China in Africa, see JAMES THUO GATHII, AFRICAN REGIONAL TRADE
AGREEMENTS AS LEGAL REGIMES (2011).
87. This refers to arguments supporting trade regionalism or bilateralism that fail to take into
account that the overriding objectives of these agreements today are not the standard arguments in
favor of free trade but much more mercantilist ideas of foreign market opening and job creation, a
phenomenon that in the United States coincided with Laura Tyson's tenure as U.S. Trade
Representative. See LAURA D'ANDREA TYSON, WHO'S BASHING WHOM?: TRADE CONFLICT IN
HIGH-TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRIES (1992).
88. This Article shows the continued use of regional and bilateral agreements particularly by big
economies as tools to pry open foreign markets while keeping their own closed. That trend for the
United States began in earnest in the 1980s. See AGGRESSIVE UNILATERALISM: AMERICA'S 301
TRADE POLICY AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM (Jagdish Bhagwati & Hugh T. Patrick eds.,
1991).
89. For reasons accounting for the current rise in bilateral and regional trade agreements, see
discussion infra Part Jl.B.
90. See Robert Devlin & Ricardo French-Davis, Towards an Evaluation of Regional Integration
in Latin America in the 1990s, in REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND MULTILATERAL COOPERATION IN
2011]
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from each sector have different concerns that are not easily solved
through multilateral trade agreements.
Bilateral and regional agreements can account for the different
conditions of particular regions. 91 Because each region has specific
needs, countries can independently agree to accords that benefit all
92parties. For example, because coastal nations have issues of interest
that do not concern land-locked nations, it would likely be much simpler
for such nations to resolve their issues in a bilateral or regional
agreement than in a multilateral setting involving land-locked nations. In
addition, bilateral and regional trade agreements are likely to be reached
much faster than multilateral agreements.93
Second, some contend that the cultural, geographical, and political
proximity of the participating countries also promotes the spread of
bilateral and regional agreements.94 According to this claim, because
neighboring countries have similar interests and strong cultural ties with
each other,95 they can negotiate agreements that are beneficial to all
parties much more quickly than in a multilateral forum.96
Third, some argue that the rules of the multilateral trading system
permit the existence of regional and bilateral trade agreements. 9 Indeed,
both the GATT and the General Agreement on Trade in Services
THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 96 (Jan Joost Teunissen ed., 1998) (noting that geographically close
countries tend to have more specialized trade because of cultural similarities and ease of transport,
while farther countries face transport and cultural challenges).
91. See generally Paul Bowles & Brian MacLean, Understanding Trade Bloc Formation. The
Case of the ASEAN Free Trade Area, 3 REV. INT'L POL. ECON. 319 (explaining benefits received by
Association of Southeast Asian (ASEAN) nations by negotiating as a bloc).
92. See id. at 328 (discussing the characteristics of trade blocs).
93. See Nathalie Chalifour, Global Trade Rules and the World's Forests. Taking Stock of the
World Trade Organization's Inplicationsfor Forests, 12 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 575, 583 n.52
(2000) (citing PIERRE MARC JOHNSON & ANDRE BEAULIEU, THE ENVIRONMENT AND NAFTA:
UNDERSTANDING AND IMPLEMENTING THE NEW CONTINENTAL LAW 1 (1996)).
94. See Bowles & MacLean, supra note 91, at 328 (discussing "successful blocs"); Sanford
Gaines, Environmental Protection in Regional Trade Agreements: Realizing the Potential, 28 ST.
LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 253, 262 (2008) (This addresses the use of RTAs to further regional
awareness and protection of the environment, especially for "countries close enough to each other
that environmental behavior in one country may have a direct effect on another." Thus, nations with
a close political proximity can use regional trade agreements to further issues of mutual interest.).
95. See Matthew W. Barrier, Regionalization: The Choice of a Neiw Millennium, 9 CURRENTS
INT'L TRADE L.J. 25, 26 (2000).
96. Id. at 33 ("[R]egional trade area integration is the fastest mode of investment cohesion that is
presently acceptable by many countries around the world.").
97. See generally Roland Bartels, Regional Trade Agreements, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (R. Wolfrum et al., ed) (Oxford Univ. Press 2010).
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(GATS) allow the creation of RTAs under certain conditions.9 8 Article
XXIV of GATT provides that "contracting parties recognize the
desirability of increasing freedom of trade by the development, through
voluntary agreements, of closer integration between the economies of
the countries parties to such agreements." 99 GATS has similar provisions
concerning services or service suppliers. 00 In addition, the decision on
"Differential and More Favorable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller
Participation of Developing Countries" allows developing countries to
extend preferences to each other without offering the same preferences
to other members. 10 1 As discussed in Part II, these standard justifications
for regional and bilateral trade agreements differ from the more
immediate reasons, such as constructivist diffusion as discussed in this
article, that account for the contemporary rise of these agreements.
B. The Breakdown of Multilateral Negotiations Has Resulted in
Forum Shifting
The continued breakdown of WTO negotiations-indicated by the
collapse of ministerial meetings in Seattle in 1999 and in Cancin,
Mexico in 2003Ihas led developed nations to a shift towards regional
and bilateral agreements to further goals that have been delayed or
frustrated at the WTO. 102 Negotiations stalled when the ministerial
conference in 1999 was cancelled due to a lack of agreement among the
countries and large protest activities outside the conference building.,
°3
In Cancin, the negotiations collapsed again. This time, developing
98. See generally General Agreement on Trade in Services, art. V, 1, Jan. 1995, available at
http://www.worldtradelaw.net/uragreements/gats.pdf [hereinafter GATS]; General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, art. XXIV, 4, Oct. 30, 1947, 1 Basic Docs. of Int'l Econ. Law 44 (Stephen
Zamora & Ronald A. Brand eds., 1990) [hereinafter GATT]; GATHII, supra note 86 (examining the
controversy relating to the permissibility of regional trade agreements).
99. GATT, supra note 98, at art. XXIV.
100. GATS, supra note 98.
101. See Diferential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of
Developing Countries, 1, L/4903 (Nov. 28, 1979), available at
http://www.wto.org/English/docs e/legal e/enabling e.pdf.
102. For more on the breakdown of WTO negotiations in this period, see James Thuo Gathii, The
High Stakes of WTO Reform, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1361 (2006) (reviewing FATOUMATA JAWARA &
AILEEN KWA, BEHIND THE SCENES AT THE WTO: THE REAL WORLD OF TRADE NEGOTIATIONS/THE
LESSONS OF CANCUN (2004)).
103. See Joseph Kahn, Siwiss Forum Has Its Focus on Memories From Seattle, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
29, 2000, at C l, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2000/01/29/business/international-business-
swiss-forum-has-its-focus-on-memories-from-seattle.htm?scp-2&sq-protest+seattle+wto+
collapse&st-nyt.
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countries were unwilling to negotiate the "Singapore issues.", 04 The
"Singapore issues" refers to four things-competition policy, trade
facilitation, investment liberalization, and government procurement-
which developed countries have sought to negotiate with a view to
arriving at new agreements covering these four areas since 1996.1 5 In
August 2004, three of the issues-investment, competition, and
government procurement-were, by agreement, dropped from the Doha
agenda.l16 Negotiations for trade facilitation, however, would
continue.1° 7 As one commentator noted, this "ended, for the time being,
the developed countries' attempt to greatly expand the WTO by
introducing three new major areas of liberalization."108
Agriculture has also become one of the most important and hotly
debated issues in these negotiations. 10 9 Developing countries have
argued that agricultural subsidies, particularly in the United States and
the EU, create an insuperable barrier for them to sell their agricultural
goods.110  The wide differences between developed nations and
104. IAN F. FERGUSSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32060, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
NEGOTIATIONS: THE DOHA DEVELOPMENT AGENDA 4 (Jan. 18, 2008),
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/69477.pdf, see also Op-Ed., Shoivdoiwn in Canciin,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2003, at A24, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/09/10/opinion/showdown-in-cancun.html.
105. IAN F. FERGUSSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21664, THE WTO CANCU N MINISTERIAL
(Nov. 6, 2003),
http://congressionalresearch.com/RS21664/document.php?study-The+WTO+Cancun+Ministerial.
106. Overview of the Doha Agenda, Canczfn 2003, Hong Kong 2005, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto e/whatis e/tif e/dohal e.htm (last visited Sept. 19, 2011).
107. See generally MARTIN KHOR, S. CTR., ANALYSIS OF THE DOHA NEGOTIATIONS AND THE
FUNCTIONING OF THE WTO (Nov. 25 2009) (draft version),
http://www.southcentre.org/index.php?option-com docman&task-doc download&gid-1678&lte
mid=182&lang-en.
108. Id. at 8.
109. See Elizabeth Becker & Ginger Thompson, Poorer Nations Plead Farmers' Case at Trade
Talks, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2003, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/09/11 /world/poorer-
nations-plead-farmers-case-at-trade-talks.html; see also Committee on Trade and Development,
Note by the Secretariat, Developmental Aspects of the Doha Round of Negotiations, 2,
WT/COMTD/W/143/Rev.4 (Aug. 19, 2010) ("Agriculture plays an important role in the
development of many WTO Members. For a large number of developing countries and least-
developed countries (LDCs), agriculture makes a significant contribution to their economies,
including its direct contribution to gross domestic production, export revenue and employment as
well as to rural development and livelihood security .... However, many of the world's agricultural
producers are currently disadvantaged in the world trading environment because of high tariff
barriers and competition from producers that receive high levels of domestic or export-related
support.").
110. See KHOR, supra note 107, at 22; see also Kevin C. Kennedy, The Incoherence of
Agricultural, Trade, and Development Policy for Sub-Saharan Africa: Sowing the Seeds of False
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developing nations on these and related issues continue to make it
unlikely that current WTO negotiations will be successfully concluded
any time soon."'1
In a sense, the current stalemate in the Doha round of negotiations
primarily pits developed countries against developing countries.
Developed countries subscribe to a vision of development that many
developing countries contest. Developing countries argue that developed
nations have been inattentive to development issues that matter to them.
This is because developed countries insist that developing countries
should adopt policies that prioritize economic growth through increased
export trade at the expense of other development objectives such as the
protection of the weak and vulnerable.1 2 In fact, developing countries
argue that their development prospects would be much better addressed
by removing agricultural subsidies in developed country markets;
ensuring access to affordable essential medicines for epidemics such as
HIV/AIDS; continuing special and differential treatment of developing
countries for their products, produce and services; and putting in place a
special safeguard mechanism (SSM) for their agricultural products-an
issue that led to a breakdown of Doha round negotiations in Geneva in
July 2008.'"
As a result of these differences between the priorities of developed
and developing countries, developed nations have, in large measure,
shifted forums towards bilateral and regional agreements. Forum shifting
is a strategy that "attempt[s] to alter the status quo ante by moving treaty
negotiations, lawmaking initiatives, or standard setting activities from
one international venue to another."' 14 Forum shifting allows countries
Hope for Sub-Saharan Afr-ica's Cotton Farmers?, 14 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 307, 316 (2005).
Although U.S. production costs for cotton "are higher, with the help of domestic and export
subsidies, U.S. cotton growers the world's largest exporters of cotton suppress and depress the
price of cotton on world markets by increasing its supply through overproduction." Id. This creates
a market that is unprofitable for least-developed countries, for which cotton and agriculture play
greater roles than they do for industrialized countries. Id. at 31.
111. See KHOR, supra note 107; see also Martin Khor, Long Stalemate Ahead for WTO Talks, S.
CTR.,
http://www.southcentre.org/index.php?option-com content&view-article&id 1274%3Asb46al &c
atid- 144%3 Asouth-bulletin-individual-articles&ltemid-287&lang-en (last visited July 14, 2011).
112. See James Thuo Gathii, Process and Substance of WTO Reform, 56 RUTGERS L. REv. 885,
902 (2003) (explaining the United States' and the EU's underestimation of how well-organized
developing countries were at the Cancun Ministerial).
113. See FERGUSSON, supra note 104, at 9-17; see also Committee on Trade and Development,
Note by Secretariat: Developmental Aspects of the Doha Round of Negotiations, 5,
WT/COMTD/W/143 (Aug. 19, 2010) (explaining that even in the March 2010 stocktaking report,
"[m]embers have not been in a position to substantively resolve matters").
114. Anke Dahrendorf, Global Proliferation of Bilateral and Regional Trade Agreements: A
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to choose a new forum where they will encounter less concerted
resistance to their agenda, which in turn gives them more wiggle room
or policy space to achieve their objectives more readily.' 5
Forum shifting through the use of regional and bilateral trade
agreements has yielded successful outcomes for developed countries.
For example, even though the Singapore issues were dropped from the
Doha agenda, developed countries are now pursuing them through
bilateral and regional trade agreements.' 16 As noted above, Global
Europe Strategy makes it a priority for the EU to pursue issues of
investment, competition, and government procurement in its EPAs with
African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries. Negotiating objectives that
were unsuccessful in the WTO become part of the EU's strategy in
bilateral and regional trade agreements. Further, according to the EU,
EPAs are also tools for "tackling issues which are not ready for
multilateral discussion."'' Thus, objectives such as enhanced
intellectual property protection and financial liberalization, which are
not formally part of the Doha agenda, are being negotiated through
bilateral or regional agreements such as the EPAs.118 Increasingly,
developed countries are using regional and bilateral agreements to
achieve objectives that are difficult, if not impossible, to achieve at the
multilateral level.' 19
As noted in a little more detail below, the competition for new
bilateral and regional trade agreements has prompted countries without
bilateral or regional agreements to begin seeing themselves as "losers
'1 20
because their products, produce and services often do not receive the
preferential treatment or trade concessions that other countries have
Threat for the World Trade Organization and/or for Developing Countries 15 (Maastricht Faculty
of Law, Working Paper No. 6, 2009) (quoting Laurence R. Heifer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPs
Agreement and New Dynamics of International Intellectual Property Laimaking, 29 YALE J. INTL
L. 1, 14 (2004)), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id- 1382820.
115. See, e.g., id. at 16. Anke Dahrendorf believes that these agreements do not preclude
discussion of these issues in a multilateral forum. Instead, these agreements are seen to function as a
"laboratory" for future multilateral agreements. Id. at 17.
116. KHOR, supra note 107, at 9.
117. Global Europe Strategy, supra note 66, at 10.
118. Id.
119. Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, Note on the Meeting of 15 16 March 2010,
WT/REG/M/56 (Mar. 23, 2010) ("The representative of El Salvador remarked that RTAs
represented an instrument to achieve deeper trade liberalization and, more recently, to strengthen
relationships between countries beyond trade.").
120. Fredrick M. Abbott, A Neiw Dominant Trade Species Emerges: Is Bilateralism A Threat?, 10
J. INT'L ECON. L. 571, 577 (2007).
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negotiated. 12 1 Indeed, even the Obama administration seems to believe
that the domestic economy will suffer if the United States does "not join
the wave of PTAs."'
122
Laurence Heifer has argued that "regime shifting might actually serve
the industrialized states' interests by diverting attention and resources
from potentially effective treaty-making efforts in [multilateral forums
such as the] WIPO or the WTO while simultaneously creating the
appearance of sharing developing countries' concerns."' 123 According to
this view, multilateral trade negotiations leave all countries better off
than bilateral and regional trade agreements. One scholar has
summarized some of the varied perspectives on the merits and demerits
of bilateral and regional agreements versus multilateral trade agreements
in the following terms:
For too many years, multilateralists have argued that bilateral
trade negotiations are a 'stumbling block' to the development of
a WTO-sponsored trade agreement, political leaders have argued
that bilateral trade negotiations are a 'building block' towards a
WTO-sponsored trade agreement, and the WTO has essentially
argued that bilateral trade negotiations are a building block and a
stumbling block.
124
The deadlock and stalemate in WTO negotiations in areas of
importance to developing countries contrasts sharply with the little
success that developed countries are often able to eke out in bilateral and
regional trade deals.1 25 Indeed, it is more likely that developing countries
would prefer to have the EU and the United States reduce agricultural
subsidies at the WTO than in bilateral and regional trade agreements. In
fact, reducing agricultural subsidies in developed countries is a crucial
precondition for success of multilateral negotiations. 26 Some scholars
have argued that developing countries may regard WTO negotiations as
121. See id. at 577-78.
122. See id. at 578.
123. Laurence R. Heifer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPS Agreement and New, Dynamics of
Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INTL LAW 1, 57 (2004) (footnote omitted); see also
Ruth L. Okediji, Back to Bilateralism? Pendulum Swings in International Intellectual Property
Protection, I U. OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 125 (2003).
124. Larry Crump, Global Trade Policy Development in a Two-Track System, 9 J. INT'L ECON. L.
487, 510 (2006).
125. See KHOR, supra note 107, at 11-13 (discussing developing countries' interest in discussing
implementation issues which were subsequently placed on the "back-burner" in favor of issues of
importance to developed nations).
126. Abbott, supra note 120, at 581-82.
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not being worth the effort if such concessions cannot be won. 127 For the
moment, forum shifting is more advantageous for developed countries
and yields few results for developing countries. Moreover, once
countries with little trade negotiating capacity shift away from
multilateral trade negotiations, issues that could have been pushed to
fruition might be ignored or given less than full attention as more focus
and resources are devoted to negotiating regional and bilateral trade
agreements.
In addition, there is often no clear understanding of the impact that
issues negotiated in bilateral agreements and regional trade agreements
128
will have on a multilateral trade system. Countries that have already
entered into regional trade agreements are only now looking back to
understand the effects these agreements will have on their economies
and on the world trading system. 12 9 The Committee on Regional Trade
Agreements has begun using the Transparency Mechanism13 to closely
analyze the merits and demerits of RTAs and make recommendations for
future negotiations. 131
C. Forum Shifting Reduces Developing Countries' Opportunities to
Form Regional Coalitions
As noted above, the United States and EU have found that it is much
easier to negotiate with countries individually or in small groups than at
the WTO. This strategy serves the interests of developed nations because
they can use their market power to leverage negotiations to their
advantage over much weaker economies. Bilateralism favors those with
more resources since it limits the ability of weaker states to form cross-
issue alliances which could increase their ability to negotiate with richer
States. 132 Similarly, WTO adjudication in the Dispute Settlement Body
127. Id.
128. See RICHARD BALDWIN & PHIL THORNTON, MULTILATERALISING REGIONALISM: IDEAS FOR
A WTO ACTION PLAN ON REGIONALISM (2008).
129. See Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, Note on the Meeting of 14 June 2010,
WT/REG/M/57 (June 24, 2010).
130. The Transparency Mechanism for RTAs was established provisionally on December 14,
2006, to provide early announcement of any RTAs to the WTO. Transparency Mechanism for
RTAs, World Trade Organization, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/region e/trans mecha e.htm
(last visited Aug. 9,2011).
131. Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, Note on the Meeting of 14 June 2010,
WT/REG/M/57 (June 24, 2010); see also Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, Note on the
Meeting of 15 16 March 2010, 4, WT/REG/M/56 (Mar. 23, 2010) (outlining committee
deliberations on how to structure the transparency mechanism).
132. Eyal Benvenisti & George W. Downs, The Empire's New Clothes: Political Economy and
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increases the likelihood that developing countries will gain better
outcomes than in bilateral negotiations. 33 By contrast, FTAs give
powerful governments the opportunity to consolidate their vision of
market governance through debt conditions, enforceable trade
commitments and tied aid. An example is the Aid for Trade program, a
$41.7 billion program 34 that conditions aid to developing countries on
subscription to the package of reforms imposed by big donors and
lenders, including international financial institutions. Aid for Trade may
further indebt developing economies and undermine rather than
contribute to poverty eradication. 35 FTAs therefore give powerful
governments an opportunity to "more directly and less publicly
[pressure] weaker governments to make extensive commitments. 1 36
At the Cancfn WTO Ministerial Meeting of 2003, a coalition of
developing countries emerged and helped to "block the adoption of an
agreement which they viewed as largely ignoring their interests."' 3
Many large developing countries-including Thailand, Brazil, and
India-worked together to create opposition blocks against developed
nations. 13  Developing countries and their supporters viewed their
successful effort at blocking the Cancin Ministerial as a victory.'3 9 The
resort to regional and bilateral trade agreements has taken away the
the Fragmentation of International Law, 60 STAN. L. REV. 595, 595 (2007)
133. See Christina L. Davis, Do WTO Rules Create a Level Playing Field? Lessons from the
Experience of Peru and Vietnam, in NEGOTIATING TRADE: DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE WTO
AND NAFTA 220 (John S. Odell ed., 2006). Davis argues that four mechanisms make this outcome
likely: (1) a guarantee for the right to negotiate, (2) a common standard for evaluating outcomes, (3)
option for several countries to join a dispute, and (4) incentives for states to change a policy found
to violate trade rules. Id.
134. Committee on Trade and Development, Note by Chairman: On the Meeting of27 May 2010,
2, WT/COMTD/AFT/M/ 15 (July 15, 2010).
135. But see generally AID FOR TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT (Dominique Njinkeu & Hugo
Cameron eds., 2008).
136. Kelsey, supra note 13, at 19.
137. Gumisai Mutume, Hope Seen in the Ashes of Cancin, AFRICA RECOVERY, Oct. 2003, at 3,
http://www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/vol 17no3/173wto.htm.
138. See Showidown in Canctin, supra note 104.
139. See Gathii, supra note 102, at 1366 (book review explaining authors' celebration of the
"Group of 20" or "G20," a coalition of developing nations that resisted the imposition of developed
nations' agendas); see also Press Release, Dep't of Commerce, G-20 Ministerial Meeting (Mar. 19,
2005) (India), available at http://commerce.nic.in/wto sub/g20/pressrel.htm (explaining importance
of agricultural negotiations in the WTO and the need for developing countries to "garner collective
strength if they are to succeed in eliminating the practices of a small group of rich nations that
provide huge amounts of support and protection to their farmers, depress prices, gain undue market
shares and compromise the food security and livelihoods of billions of farmers across developing
countries").
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potential to build coalitions to advance the interests of developing
countries, like those formed at Cancin. However, as it will be shown
below, it is still possible for groups of developing countries to advance
their interests by declining to enter into trade agreements inimical to
their interests.
The EU's EPA with CARIFORUM countries illustrates the EU's
success in effectively extracting concessions from developing countries
grouped in a region. The EU maintained the negotiating positions it held
at the WTO when it attended the CARIFORUM negotiations. Unlike at
the WTO, the CARIFORUM states did not have the bargaining
advantage that could be accomplished by building coalitions with
similarly situated countries. Consequently, the EU held fast to its
position on labor mobility in its EPA with the CARIFORUM nations, as
it had done in its negotiations with India, by allowing only certain
classes of immigrants access to the EU. In essence, the EU was able to
negotiate an asymmetric deal in its favor that restricted access to the EU
for labor from CARIFORUM states, which they have in plenty. 140 The
commitments that the EU won in the CARIFORUM EPA were
significantly larger than the service liberalization commitments that the
CARIFORUM states had committed to "in their GATS 1994 schedules
and offered in the GATS 2000 negotiations; for example, Suriname went
from 15 to 75 percent, Grenada from 23 to 69 percent and Guyana from
19 to 82 percent. ' ' 141 This means that the small economies of Suriname
and Grenada have become that much more open to European firms and
labor and as such these small economies will face stiff competition from
far more efficient service providers from the EU. This does not bode
well for local service providers without the wherewithal to compete with
these foreign providers. Foreign service providers therefore displace
local producers, resulting not only in job losses from competing products
and services but, more importantly, in reducing the ability of local firms
to innovate, grow or to train their own highly skilled personnel.
The United States has also leveraged its market power over groups of
developing countries by holding firm to its model FTA as the minimum
it is willing to sign onto. The case of SACU, which is discussed at length
below, is illustrative of this approach. According to Tshediso Matona,
the South African Director-General of the Department of Trade and
140. See KELSEY, supra note 72, at 81 93. Chapter Four of the EPA seems to suggest entry for
the elite or well educated classes of CARIFORUM states but holds multiple reservations and
conditions that prevent many from making use of the access. Kelsey cautions other ACP countries
against seeking concessions on labor mobility when negotiating with the EU. Id.
141. Id. at 10.
[Vol. 86:421
HeinOnline  -- 86 Wash. L. Rev. 448 2011
NEOLIBERAL TURN IN RTAs
Industry:
The U.S. approach is not developmental .... When we engage
in trade negotiations at the World Trade Organisation, we make
the point that countries must open their economies to the extent
that their economies are able to cope. We want to be able to
phase in liberalisation, and exempt certain items. They want free
trade now and they want everything. They want to retain the
right to subsidise their agriculture. They have a template-based
approach. One of their agencies conceded: 'We don't want to
negotiate. We put a paper down and show you this is where you
sign. 142
With these types of negotiating techniques, it is not surprising that
less-developed nations have much less room to negotiate terms that are
beneficial to their economies in a bilateral or regional setting than in a
multilateral setting such as the WTO.
D. Other Reasons Accounting for the Spread of Regionalism and
Bilateralism
So far, this Article has focused on how the breakdown of multilateral
trade negotiations and incentives to shift negotiating venues has
influenced the spread of bilateralism and regionalism. There are,
however, other explanations: the spread of bilateralism and regionalism
can also be accounted for by constructivist and competition
explanations. From this vantage point, none of these theories is in itself
determinative. Below, these constructivist and competition accounts of
the spread of bilateralism and regionalism in trade are examined.
1. The Influence of Global Norms: Constructivist Explanations
Constructivism provides a sociological explanation for the spread of
bilateralism and regionalism among countries in the periphery of the
world trading system. Under this explanation, these countries are simply
following a fad or the example of developed economies even though no
solid evidence has established the benefits of bilateralism and
regionalism. 143 Because bilateralism and regionalism are often depicted
142. Michael Hamlyn, UIS. All-or-Nothing Position Derails Free Trade Talks, BILATERALS.ORG
(Nov. 16, 2006), http://bilaterals.org/spip.php?article6489.
143. Frank Dobbin, Beth Simmons & Geoffrey Garret, The Global Diffusion of Public Policies:
Social Construction, Coercion, Competition, or Learning?, 33 ANN. REV. Soc. 449, 451 (2007); see
also Witold Henisz, Bennet Zelner & Mauro Guillen, The Worlclide Diffusion of Market-Oriented
Infrastructure Reform, 1977 1999, 70 AM. Soc. REV. 871 (2005) (arguing that emulation explains
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as integral to economic growth by their proponents, particularly in
developed countries, economies in the periphery of the world trading
system have embraced them.
Constructivism can also account for the rise of bilateral and regional
trade agreements as a result of the preferences of actors supporting the
agenda in these agreements within the respective domestic domains
before these preferences come to constitute those of the state and
eventually of international society. 144 In other words, the neoliberal ideas
embedded in regional trade agreements do not simply reflect the material
goals of interest groups, but are also culturally grounded ideals of a
particular type of economic governance. These neoliberal ideas are
therefore as much constituted, or given meaning, by the underlying
material interests, 145 as by the ideas and meanings attached to them both
by actors that shape them and those who are persuaded to adopt them as
their own.146 Thus, from a constructivist perspective, neoliberalism in
the core and periphery of the global economic system is produced in part
by habits and expectations among actors and not simply on the basis of
imposition. There has indeed been a convergence in academic and policy
thinking about economic reforms motivated in part by similar
considerations, such as concern for higher economic growth and greater
efficiency in the provision of public services. 141
the diffusion patterns of market-oriented reforms).
144. See generally Alexander Wendt, Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction
of Poiver Politics, 46 INT'L ORG. 391 (1992). Wendt argues that "the raw materials out of which
members of the state system are constituted is created by domestic society before states enter the
constitutive process of international society." Id. at 402. Constructivists, according to Wendt, "share
a cognitive, intersubljective conception of process in which identities and interests are endogenous to
interaction, rather than a rationalist-behavioral one in which they are exogenous." Id. at 394.
145. Realists and critics of neoliberalism would argue that these material interests are the pursuit
of power. See Janine Brodie, Globalization, Canadian Family Policy, and the Omission of
Neoliberalism, 88 N.C. L. REV. 1559, 1566 (2010).
146. See, e.g., Kelly, supra note 1, at 693. Kelly argues that a modified constructivist approach
can simultaneously acknowledge power and interests as well as how these are constituted, because
access, process and transparency ameliorate the lack of inclusiveness in defining global norms. She
also argues that modified constructivism reintroduces national constituency preferences, which
helps secure compliance with its rules. Id. at 699. Kelly refers to this as the "normative feedback
loop." Id. at 674. However, she notes that such a loop is likely to be diluted when a state, after
forming its identity through the feedback of its domestic constituencies, then has to negotiate with
other states at the international level. Id. at 721.
147. See William Mitchell, Beyond Austerity, THE NATION, Mar. 16, 2011, available at
http://www.thenation.com/article/159288/beyond-austerity (discussing neoliberalism relating to the
financial crisis); see also Philip G. Cerny, Georg Menz & Susanne Soederberg, Different Roads to
Globalization: Neoliberalism, the Competition State, and Politics in a More Open World, in
INTERNALIZING GLOBALIZATION: THE RISE OF NEOLIBERALISM AND THE DECLINE OF NATIONAL
VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM 1, 19 (Susanne Soederberg, Georg Menz & Philip G. Cerny eds., 2005)
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While initially neoliberalism in developing countries depended almost
exclusively on exogenous coercive imposition through conditionality, 48
today the tool kit for its diffusion includes the fact that third world states
are consciously and increasingly redefining their identities in terms of
understandings and commitments consistent with neoliberalism. 149 Many
of these countries want to be seen as "safe" for investment and are
arguably adopting neoliberal ideas as a strategic response to the fact that
investors want the assurance of investing in economies where they have
a chance to reap the highest returns. Thus, countries that want to attract
investment may have to adopt neoliberal reforms independent of any
direct coercion.
For this reason, some of the most neoliberal leaning adherents are no
longer exclusively based at the World Bank, the International Monetary
Fund (IMF), or in Washington or Brussels. For example, one of the most
neoliberal outposts in Africa is the small land-locked East African
country of Rwanda. In 2010, the World Bank's Doing Business:
Reforming Through Difficult Times report ranked Rwanda as the world's
top performer in the types of regulatory reforms that made it easier for
doing business."5 Among the reforms Rwanda put in place were:
reduction in the procedures to start a business to only two so that a new
business could be started in three days;' 5 ' reorganizing the property
registry to reduce the time it takes to transfer property;15 2 adopting a
more efficient import and export system;1 53 and, increasing investor
protection and the range of assets that entrepreneurs can use as security
to secure credit. 154 Rwanda has been adopting these types of neoliberal
(discussing the forces moving neoliberalism in the same direction).
148. Tayyab Mahmud, "Surplus Humanity" and the Margins of Legality: Slums, Slumdogs, and
Accumulation by Dispossession, 14 CHAP. L. REv. 1, 22 (2010) (citing Vaughan Lowe, The Politics
of Law-Making: Are the Method and Character of Norm Creation Changing?, in THE ROLE OF LAW
IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: ESSAYS N INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
207, 212 (Michael Byers ed., 2000)).
149. As noted below, some of this redefinition is stage management with a view to accessing
credit and capital. See infra notes 165-200 and accompanying text. Additionally, there is clearly
self-interest in adopting self-binding commitments like neoliberalism as the reigning development
paradigm. Such commitments are in turn rewarded in a variety of ways including aid and credit. Id.
150. World Bank and the Int'l Fin. Corp., Doing Business in 2010: Reforming Through Difficult
Times, at 2 (2009),
http://www.doingbusiness.org/-/media/fpdkm/doing /20business/documents/annual-
reports/english/dblO-fullreport.pdf.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 49.
154. Id. at 39.
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reforms since before 2008. The 2011 Doing Business Report noted that
Rwanda was the second most improved business reformer over the last
five years and had jumped twelve places to become the fifty-eighth
ranked country in the 2011 index.
15 5
Clearly, Rwanda has not recently converted to neoliberalism. Within
the East African Community, Rwanda has been ahead of all the other
members in opening its economy to citizens of other member states
through the rights of residence and establishment, while other member
states, like Tanzania, have remained reticent. 5 6 In fact, regional and
international economic integration is a central plank of Rwanda's Vision
2020, a policy document aimed at transforming Rwanda into a middle-
income country. 157 The other five pillars of this vision are a central part
of the neoliberal orthodoxy: private-sector-led economy, good
governance and a capable state, human resource development and a
knowledge-based economy, infrastructure development, and productive
and market-oriented agriculture.
158
Rwanda's economic reforms have been so impressive that Western
aid donors have ignored the political repression of the opposition in
Rwanda. 159 This is also true of other economic reformers, such as
Uganda's Yoweri Museveni and, to some extent, Ethiopia's Meles
Zenawi.16 There appear to be other factors at play, including the very
155. World Bank and the Int'l Fin. Corp., Doing Business in 2011: Making a Difference for
Entrepreneurs, at 4 (2010),
http://www.doingbusiness.org/-/media/fpdkm/doing /o20business/documents/annual-
reports/english/dbll-fullreport.pdf. But see Kevin E. Davis & Michael B. Kruse, Taking the
Measure of Lair: The Case of the Doing Business Project, 32 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 1095 (2007)
(taking a skeptical look at Doing Business reports).
156. On the East African Community's Common Market Protocol which came into effect in July
2010, see GATHII, supra note 86; World Bank and the Int'l Fin. Corp., Doing Business in the East
African Community 2010,
http://www.doingbusiness.org/-/media/FPDKM/Doing /o20Business/Documents/Profiles/Regional/
DB2010/DB1O-East-African-Community.pdf (discussing Rwanda's advancements over its EAC
partners).
157. REPUBLIC OF RWANDA, RWANDA VISION 2020 11 (2010),
http://www.minecofin.gov.rw/webfm send/1700.
158. Id.
159. See generally Efficiency Versus Freedom. The West Should Not Be Silent When Efficient
Leaders, Such as Rwanda's, Squash the Opposition, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 5, 2010, at 10,
available at http://www.economist.com/node/16743333.
160. See Jason McLure, Why Democracy Isn't Working: Despite an Economic Renaissance,
Much of Africa is Drifting Toward a New Age of Authoritarianism, NEWSWEEK, Jun. 18, 2010,
available at http://www.newsweek.com/2010/06/18/why-democracy-isn-t-working.html.
Museveni's re-election in February of2011 resulted in a congratulatory message from the U.S. State
Department that also noted the limitations Museveni had placed on the opposition to campaign
freely without intimidation, electoral irregularities such as voter bribery and use of state funds to
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powerful influences of donor agencies such as USAID and the UK's
Department for International Development. 16 1 Undoubtedly, there are
African government bureaucrats, civil society groups, and organizations
whose budget lines depend on these market-oriented donors and who
invariably subscribe to neoliberalism for self-interested reasons. Small
countries like Rwanda may adopt neoliberalism and seek to reproduce it
for selfish reasons, such as attracting foreign investment. After all,
adoption of neoliberalism has been embraced within a community of
mutual recognition that includes prospective investors and business
intermediaries, like banks and insurance companies. 162 For these actors,
adoption of neoliberalism also signals to foreign investors that their
163investments would be protected in that country.
Another reason for the adoption of neoliberalism is that there is a
much broader group of economists, including those in the Rwandese
government, who studied in economics departments that fully subscribe
to neoliberal economic reformism and believe in the efficacy of its
ideals. Clearly neoliberalism has come to be adopted by this wide array
of actors, including government economists and non-governmental
activists, yet its prevalence cannot be solely accounted for by a narrative
of imposition through conditionalities. 164 Despite the fact that actors
have the freedom to choose whether or not to adopt neoliberal ideas,
once created, inter-subjective understandings and expectations acquire a
self-perpetuating character.1 65 This is consistent with accounts of
neoliberalism as practiced through World Bank or IMF conditionalities.
It is not a one-way street imposition on recipient countries on a take-it-
help Museveni retain power as well as the fact there was no independent electoral commission in
place. See Press Release, Philip J. Crowley, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Pub. Affairs, State
Dep't, Uganda's Elections (Feb. 27, 2011), http://www. state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011102/1 56940.htm.
On vote bribery, see Rosebell Kagumire, Museveni Gets Another Five Year Lease in Most
Expensive Election, ROSEBELL'S BLOG (Feb. 24, 2011),
http://rosebellkagumire.com/2011/02/24/museveni-gets-more-five-year-lease-in-most-expensive-
election-deal/ (noting that Museveni seems to have learned that voter bribery is more efficient than
election violence).
161. McLure, supra note 160; see also DAMBISA MOYO, DEAD AID: WHY AID IS NOT WORKING
AND How THERE IS A BETTER WAY FOR AFRICA (2009).
162. For more on communities of mutual recognition, see generally Wendt, supra note 144.
163. See Beth Simmons, Money and the Law: Why Comply With the Public International Law of
Money, 25 YALE J. INTL L. 323, 342 (2000) (arguing that the IMF uses its sanctioning power
sparingly because most states comply with IMF policies due to the fact that compliance signals that
their money is safe and non-compliance would make their countries uncompetitive).
164. Wendt, supra note 144, at 410 ("Far from being exogenously given, the intersubjective
knowledge that constitutes competitive identities and interests is constructed every day by processes
of social will formation.") (internal quotations omitted).
165. Id. at 411.
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or-leave-it basis, but rather, is a bargaining and negotiating process to
determine the level of borrowed amounts and conditions between
borrower governments, on the one hand, and the World Bank and IMF,
on the other.166 Robert Wade has shown how East Asian governments,
such as Taiwan, bought into the Washington Consensus, but
implemented a vision of economic governance at variance with their
professed commitment to neoliberalism. 16' This insight about the
strategic appropriation of neoliberalism dovetails with Alvaro Santos's
account of the wide-ranging appeal of the World Bank's rule of law
projects, 68 because the vague definition of rule of law not only obscures
contradictions or tensions within it,169 but also appeals to: local
businesses and associations that have the ability to lobby for a favorable
business environment; 7 public officials and political parties because of
its promise to reduce corruption;"' judges who seek to use the resources
provided to increase their professional status;' 1 2 legal scholars working
as consultants; 173 lawyers benefitting from more clients;1 74 and NGO
activists attracted by the promise to not only combat corruption, but also
to increase access to justice for the poor, women, and the
disenfranchised. 
175
The diffusion of bilateralism and regionalism from the site of its
production within the interstices of the Washington Consensus to sites of
reception, both in developing and developed countries, has been
documented in the past with regard to other fads. 17 6 For instance,
166. 1 PAUL MOSLEY, JANE HARRIGAN & JOHN TOYE, Preface to AID AND POWER: THE WORLD
BANK AND POLICY-BASED LENDING, at xiii (2d ed. 1995) (arguing that the best way to understand
policy-conditioned loans was as a "dynamic bargaining process").
167. See Robert Wade, East Asia's Economic Success: Conflicting Perspectives, Partial Insights,
Shaky Evidence, 44 WORLD POL. 270 (1992) (discussing neoliberal explanations for East Asian
economic success as ignoring the importance of government intervention in that success).
168. Alvaro Santos, The World Bank's Use of the "Rule of Law" Promise in Economic
Development, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 253, 253
(David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006) ("[A] legal order consisting of predictable,
enforceable and efficient rules required for a market economy to flourish.").
169. The rule of law exhibits several contradictions and tensions, for example, between
individualism and communitarianism or between procedural and substantive justice. See BRIAN Z.
TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY 84-85 (2004).
170. Santos, supra note 168 at 297.
171. Id. at 281.
172. Id. at 297.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 298-99.
175. Id. at 298-99.
176. On diffusion and reception, see generally Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizations of Law
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scholars have shown that countries are more likely to ratify women's
rights conventions in years when there are rights conferences,"' or how
the ideas of John Maynard Keynes led to the rise of Keynesian
economics. 78 In this sense, changes in ideas and institutions are
attributable to socialization. However, constructivism also refers to the
possibility of producing and reproducing all identities and interests
anew. 179 Notably, my account of the diffusion of neoliberalism is that it
is not simply being produced in Western capitals like Washington and
received in the periphery, but rather is being reproduced in the periphery
as well. After all, neoliberalism has taken many incarnations since it was
inaugurated in the 1980s and its various manifestations are therefore
being produced, reproduced, and diffused around the world
simultaneously.
The United States and the EU have actively promoted regionalism
and bilateralism and pursued neoliberal ideas through policy actions.
Under a constructivist paradigm, these governments have modeled
behavior that is mimicked by developing economies. This mimicry or
emulation is voluntary rather than coerced. Neoliberal ideas have, in
effect, had a constitutive relationship to the growth of bilateralism and
regionalism in trade. Once bilateralism and regionalism caught on in the
EU and the United States, the trend seems to have spread among
developing countries without consideration as to whether or not it was
beneficial. 180 Thus, even some of the smallest, least developed countries
in the world, such as Lesotho, openly acknowledge that the success of
regionalism in trade elsewhere has persuaded them to pursue
regionalism more aggressively. ' 81
Some have argued that the current rise of bilateral trade agreements is
and Legal Thought: 1850-2000, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL
APPRAISAL, supra note 168, at 19-73.
177. Cristine Min Wotipka & Francisco 0. Ramirez, World Society and Human Rights: An Event
History Analysis of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, in THE GLOBAL DIFFUSION OF MARKETS AND DEMOCRACY 303, 332 (Beth A. Simmons et
al. eds., 2008).
178. See generally PETER A. HALL, THE POLITICAL POWER OF ECONOMIC IDEAS: KEYNESIANISM
ACROSS NATIONS (Peter A. Hall ed. 1989) (discussing the history of Keynesianism and its
adoption).
179. See Wendt, supra note 144, at 411.
180. Other ideas, such as mass schooling and civil service reforms, have been shown to have
spread in a similar manner. See Dobbin, Simmons & Garret, supra note 143, at 451-54.
181. See Propane Lebesa, Minister of Trade and Industry, Opening Address at LDC Trade
Ministers Meeting (Feb. 2008) (noting that until recently regional economic groupings were not
pursued as a strategy in that the past but that "in recent years [] it is being experimented with more
seriously when success of the approach is in evidence elsewhere").
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the result the success of the EU model in European integration which has
in turn often served as a rhetorical model for advocates of regionalism.
On its part, the EU has been an active proponent of the benefits of
regionalism. 182  The EU is spreading regionalism directly through
commitments like the Cotonou Agreement with the African, Caribbean,
and Pacific (ACP) countries. 183  The Cotonou Agreement, whose
objectives include eradication of poverty and integrating ACP countries
in the global economy, set in motion a series of interim economic
partnership agreements with various ACP regions and a completed EPA
with Caribbean countries, the CARIFORUM EPA discussed above.
1 84
Together, these agreements establish goals and mechanisms to monitor
what are essentially EU ideas and principles of economic reform and
trade integration in ACP countries. In this sense, emulation can create
hegemony because ACP countries adopt the EU's ideas and principles of
economic and trade governance as part of their domestic legal and policy
framework.185
2. Competition for Resources and Markets
Just as countries compete for capital and export markets, there is an
element of competition for the best bilateral or regional trade deal-
particularly between the EU, the United States, Brazil, India, and China
182. Mario Tel6, Between Trade Liberalization and Various Paths Towards Deeper Cooperation,
in EUROPEAN UNION AND NEW REGIONALISM: REGIONAL ACTORS AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE IN
A POST HEGEMONIC WORLD 128, 144 (Mario Telo ed. 2007) (noting an explicit emulation of the
EU in Africa); see also Albert Higgott, Alternative Models of Regional Cooperation: The Limits of
Institutionalization in East Asia, in EUROPEAN UNION AND NEW REGIONALISM 75, 77
("Regionalism is invariably conceptualized with comparative reference to Europe even though it is
clear that policy learning and the politics of emulation . . . are maior features of the current
deliberations about regionalism in other parts of the world, and especially East Asia.").
183. See Cotonou Agreement, supra note 64, at art. 35(2) (providing that "[e]conomic and trade
cooperation shall build on regional integration initiatives of ACP States" as a principal objective).
See Partnership Agreement, ACP-EU, June 23, 2000, 2000 O.J. (L 317) 3, art. 37(1),
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.douri=OJ:L:2000:317:0003:0286:EN:PDF
("Economic partnership agreements shall be negotiated during the preparatory period which shall
end by 31 December 2007 at the latest."); see also, id. at arts. 35(2), 37(5) (providing a basis for
conducting EPA negotiation with the regions rather than bilaterally, as part of the Cotonou
Agreement's goal of strengthening regionalism in order to integrate ACP countries into the
international trading system).
184. For objectives and fundamental principles of the Cotonou Agreement, see Cotonou
Agreement, supra note 64, at. arts. 1, 2.
185. See Rita Giacalone, Is European Inter-Regionalism A Relevant Approach for the World or
Just for Europe? (Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series, Vol. 7, No. 14, Sept. 2007),
http://www6.miami.edu/eucenter/Giacalone-EUreglnteg-long070918.pdf. For further discussion,
see GATHI, supra note 86.
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on one hand, and developing countries, on the other. 186 Thus, the
propensity to sign a bilateral investment agreement is much higher if
neighboring countries have signed such agreements. 8 Much sought
after markets are vigorously pursued by countries looking for the best
trade deal. In addition, countries that want to attract foreign direct
investment or other trade benefits have been shown to compete by
offering incentives.' As discussed above, many countries, including
LDCs, freely acknowledge that they cannot afford to be left behind.
The increasing popularity of Most Favored Nation (MFN) clauses in
bilateral and regional trade agreements 89 is further evidence of
competition for the best trade deals. The MFN clause in the GATT, the
basic multilateral trade agreement, provides for non-discriminatory
treatment by obliging signatories to extend the same privileges and
concessions to all the members of a trade agreement. An MFN clause in
a regional or bilateral trade agreement may be surprising because it is
often assumed that regional and bilateral trade agreements confer
exclusive benefits to the signatories-as such, an MFN clause extending
benefits to non-members in bilateral and regional agreements
inconsistently with the GATT MFN clause is very unusual. Developed
economies like the EU have insisted on MFN clauses particularly in
EPAs to ensure that whatever concessions are granted under a future
regional trade agreement are also extended to current regional trade
signatories. The CARIFORUM EPA has such an MFN clause; it applies
186. See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Trade and Development Report,
53, UNCTAD/TDR/2007 (2007), http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/tdr2007 en.pdf. Some of the best
academic work done here includes, Bergsten, C.F., "Competitive Liberalization and Global Free
Trade: A Vision for the Early 21st Century," Working Paper No. 96-15 (Washington DC, Institute
for International Economics); Richard E. Baldwin, A Domino Theory of Regionalism, in
EXPANDING MEMBERSHIP IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 25 (Richard E. Baldwin et al. eds, 1995)
(advancing the competitive liberalization hypothesis to account for the increased spread of regional
and bilateral trade agreements and advancing a domino theory to account for the increased spread of
regionalism and bilateralism).
187. RASUL SHAMS, HAMBURG INST. INT'L ECON. (HWWA), PAPER No. 61, -NATURAL
INTEGRATION": A NEW APPROACH TO REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 6
(1998), http: /ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/26210/ 1/dp980061 .pdf.
188. See Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: Explaining the
Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT'L L. 639, 657 (1998) (explaining that poor
countries sign investment treaties to attract foreign investment even though those treaties are often
inimical to their best interests).
189. See El Hadji A. Diouf, Why the MAFN Clause Should Not Be Included in EPAs, TRADE
NEGOTIATIONS INSIGHTS (Eur. Ctr. for Dev. Policy Mgmt. and Int'l Ctr. for Trade and Sustainable
Dev.), Oct. 2010, at 8, http://www.acp-eu-trade.org/library/files/tni en 9-8.pdf.; Cheikh Tidiane
Dieye & Victoria Hanson, MFN Provisions in EPAs: A Threat to South-South Trade?, TRADE
NEGOTIATIONS INSIGHTS (Eur. Ctr. for Dev. Policy Mgmt. and Int'l Ctr. for Trade and Sustainable
Dev.), Mar. 2008, at 1, http://www.acp-eu-trade.org/library/files/TNI EN 7-2.pdf
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to all subsequent free trade agreements insofar as they cover customs,
duties, commercial presence, and investment, cross-border supply of
services, and where they involve developed countries or major trading
economies.190 As such, should the CARIFORUM states give the United
States concessions in these areas, an obligation to extend similar
concessions to the EU would be automatically triggered.
Alternatively, MFNs have required signatory countries to commence
new negotiations upon entering into agreements with other developed
countries. This requirement is well illustrated in the Pacific Agreement
on Closer Economic Cooperation (PACER) between New Zealand,
Australia, and the Pacific Island countries of the South Pacific.191 New
Zealand and Australia have argued that Article 6(3)(a) and (b) of
PACER requires all fourteen Pacific Island countries to negotiate a new
trade agreement following the signing of a Pacific Interim EPA which
covers trade in goods and that only Fiji and Papua New Guinea have
signed. 192 Australia and New Zealand have helped the Pacific Island
countries set up a fully funded Office of the Chief Trade Advisor to the
Forum Island Countries Secretariat to help them negotiate a PACER-
PLUS Agreement. The increasing use of such clauses demonstrates
rising competition for access to foreign markets with the most
advantageous concessions possible.
For example, China and India are in a furious competition for Africa's
mineral wealth and access to its markets. This is reflected by the fact that
both countries are engaged in a race for trade and investment
agreements. 193 These "emerging economic giants" and their burgeoning
economies are creating a greater demand for natural resources and light
190. See Economic Partnership Agreement, CARIFORUM States-European Cmty., art. 70, Oct.
30, 2008, 2008 O.J. (L 289) 3,
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2008/february/tradoc 137971.pdf [hereinafter CARIFORUM
EPA]. "MaIor trading economy" is defined as any developing country representing individually
more than 1% of world merchandise exports or, a group of countries with more than 1.5% of world
merchandise exports. Id. at art. 19, 4. For more on the CARIFORUM EPA, see KELSEY, supra
note 72.
191. Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relations, PACIFIC ISLANDS FORUM SECRETARIAT,
http://forum.forumsec.org/resources/uploads/attachments/documents/PACER.pdf (last visited Sept.
21,2011).
192. See Technical Centre for Agricultural and Rural Cooperation [CTA], Executive Brief"
Update, EPA Negotiation Issues Between Pacific and the EU, 2 (Apr. 2010),
http://agritrade.cta.int/en/content/download/2721/139440 file/2d63bal6772c8c8f89eb6303aa9O8bab
.pdf.
193. Harry G. Broadman, Afi-ica's Silk Road. China and India's New Economic Frontier, WORLD
BANK 1, 42 (2007),
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/AFRICAEXT/Resources/Africa Silk Road.pdf.
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manufactured goods. 194 Although Chinese and Indian foreign direct
investment (FDI) in Africa have traditionally been concentrated in the
oil extraction and mining industries, in recent years, FDI flows between
the two Asian countries and Africa has become more diversified, with
FDI now in the apparel industry and processed foods, as well as other
sectors.195
In order to encourage collective consultation and to promote political
dialogue and economic cooperation with African countries, China
established the Forum for China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). 
9 6
FOCAC's fourth ministerial conference was hosted by Egypt in
November 2010197 to review implementation of action items from the
Beijing Summit of the Forum held three years earlier and to discuss new
ways to enhance Sino-African trade relations. 198 To this end, FOCAC
adopted the Sharm El Sheikh Action Plan of the Forum on China-Africa
Cooperation at the conference. 99 The Sharm El Sheikh Action Plan
seeks to strengthen Sino-African cooperation in political affairs; regional
peace and security; international affairs; economic and social
development; and cultural and people-to-people exchanges.2 ° ° China has
promised to extend $10 billion in preferential loans to African countries
over the next three years to be used for infrastructure and social
development projects.20 ' China has also agreed to support African
regional integration efforts.20 2 At the time of writing, China has signed
bilateral agreements with thirty-three African countries to expand trade
and investment and another eleven agreements to avoid double taxation,
and has investment interests in forty-nine African countries.23
In sum, this Article has made two primary claims regarding
competition for resources and markets. First, regional and bilateral trade
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. See Characteristics of FOCAC, FORUM ON CHINA-AFRICA COOPERATION,
http://www.focac.org/eng/ltda/ltjj/ 157576.htm (last visited Aug. 21, 2010).
197. Declaration of Sharm El Sheikh of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, FORUM ON
CHINA-AFRICA COOPERATION (Nov. 12, 2009), http://www.focac.org/eng/zxxx/t626388.htm.
198. See id.
199. See id.
200. See Sharm El Sheikh Action Plan (2010-2012), FORUM ON CHINA-AFRICA COOPERATION
(Nov. 12, 2009), http://www.focac.org/eng/zxxx/t626387.htm.
201. Id. at art. 4.3.3.
202. Id. at art. 4.3.2.
203. See China-Afr-ica Economic Trade Cooperation, INFO. OFF. ST. COUNCIL (Dec. 28, 2010),
http://www.gov.cn/english/official/2010-12/23/content1771603.htm.
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agreements are now a preferred policy preference for both developing
and developed countries. The breakdown of WTO negotiations has
played an important role in the proliferation of regional and bilateral
trade agreements; countries have shifted from the WTO's trade
framework to regional and bilateral trade agreements. Second, a
convergence in policy preferences in favor of free trade as a national
economic strategy is an equally important factor accounting for the
popularity of regional and bilateral trade agreements. This common
policy preference undermines claims that developed countries have
imposed their free trade preferences on developing countries. However,
many of the bilateral trade agreements negotiated between developing
and developed countries impose unequal obligations on developing
countries. Part III of this Article will further examine these inequities by
showing that bilateral agreements have become an important avenue for
promoting the neoliberal agenda of the Washington Consensus-free
trade, openness to foreign investment, and free market reforms such as
deregulation and privatization.
III. FORTIFYING THE NEOLIBERAL AGENDA OF THE
WASHINGTON CONSENSUS
Bilateral and regional trade agreements have become a major avenue
for implementing the Washington Consensus in developing countries.
The Washington Consensus has ten elements: fiscal discipline,
redirection of public expenditures to fields offering high economic
returns, tax reform, interest rate liberalization, a competitive exchange
rate, trade liberalization, liberalization towards foreign direct investment,
privatization, deregulation, and secured property rights.0 4  These
elements, originally outlined in 1989 by John Williamson, have been
prescribed as necessary to promote economic development in developing
countries. °5
Openness to trade, foreign direct investment, and market economy
reforms such as deregulation and privatization of public enterprises,
have been hallmarks of the Washington Consensus. Advocates of
openness argue that developing countries can achieve economic
204. Joel M. Ngugi, Policing ANeoliberal Reforms: The Rule of Lau, as an Enabling and
Restrictive Discourse, 26 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 513, 584 (2005) (citing John Williamson, What
Washington Means by Policy Reform, in LATIN AMERICAN ADJUSTMENT: How MUCH HAS
HAPPENED? 5, 7 (John Williamson ed., 1990)).
205. See John Williamson, Senior Fellow, Inst. for Int'l Econ., The Washington Consensus as
Policy Prescription for Development, Lecture for the "Practitioners in Development" Series at the
World Bank (Jan 13. 2004), http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/williamson0204.pdf.
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development by liberalizing their markets and dismantling the welfare
206
state so that services such as energy, telecommunications, and water
are no longer state provided. The IMF and the World Bank have
conditioned developing countries' access to funds on their acceptance of
the Washington Consensus.
2 °7
Regional and bilateral trade agreements have increasingly introduced
elements of the Washington Consensus into developing economies. For
example, commitments in the area of trade of services in bilateral and
regional trade agreements have become a primary route of introducing
private provisioning of public goods like water, education and health
care. 208 Thus, the market is increasingly supplanting public provisioning
of important services in accordance with the commitment to market
governance of the Washington Consensus. 20 9
Bilateral and regional trade agreements that promote the liberalization
and deregulation of public services further remove the policy space to
make public policy decisions that would not be contrary to the
commitments made in these agreements. For example, the loss of such
regulatory autonomy following urban water privatization has in some
instances resulted in degradation of service provisioning while limiting
the ability of governments to take corrective measures.2  These
agreements create binding rules of establishment, acquisition, expansion,
management, conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of foreign
investments on the territory of the developing countries. More
importantly, these rules compel competition for activities that were
previously provided by public monopolies, such as postal services and
telecommunications. By incorporating such commitments, regional and
206. James Thuo Gathii, Good Governance as a Counter Insurgency Agenda to Oppositional and
Transformative Social Projects in International Law, 5 BUFF. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 107 (1999); see
also Chimugwuanya Nwobike, The WTO Compatible ACP-EU Trade Partnership: Interpreting the
Reciprocity Requirement to Further Development, 8 ASPER REV. INT'L BuS. & TRADE L. 87, 101,
106 n. 94 (2008).
207. See Gathii, supra note 206, at 141.
208. Africa's Trade in Services and Economic Partnership Agreements, supra note 11, at 1.
209. See generally KERRY RITTICH, RECHARACTERIZING RESTRUCTURING: LAW, DISTRIBUTION
AND GENDER IN MARKET REFORM 52 (2002).
210. For example, Tanzania privatized water provisioning in one of its cities, but was able to
retake the service after a foreign investor was unable to effectively provide water for city residents.
The foreign investor brought an arbitration proceeding against Tanzania alleging violations of a
bilateral investment treaty. Tanzania successfully defended its decision to retake the service and
cancelled the contract with the foreign investor. See Biwater Gauff, Ltd. v. Tanz., ICSID Case No.
ARB/05/22, at 99 (July 24, 2008),
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal-showDoc&docl
d-DC1589 En&caseld-C67.
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bilateral trade agreements have granted American, European, and other
multinational corporations expanded reach into previously untapped
consumer markets.
The EPA between the CARIFORUM states and the EU best illustrates
how a regional trade agreement can promote the goals of the
Washington Consensus. The agreement removes the CARIFORUM
states' ability to impose currency controls vis-d-vis the EU, thereby
requiring the liberalization of CARIFORUM financial markets
consistently with the goals of the Washington consensus.2 1' Committing
certain sectors to their services schedule, CARIFORUM states
automatically open these sectors to foreign investors under the national
treatment norm.212 Opening CARIFORUM states to migration of high
level professionals without also obliging the EU to accept low-skilled
labor from CARIFORUM nations effectively creates unequal obligations
insofar as the EC gets market opening concessions in the services sector
without making reciprocating concessions in a services area of
213importance to CARIFORUM states. Removing CARIFORUM states'
discretion to exercise regulatory authority in any manner that
discriminates against foreign investor presence and giving them the right
to have equivalent commercial presence as local investors is consistent
with the Washington Consensus goal of strengthening investor
214protections.
As these commitments come into effect, multinational corporations
from the EU will have free reign to trade in these nations because local
governments will no longer have regulatory authority to control the
corporations' activities or protect competing local investors. In other
words, markets that have been traditionally government controlled will
be open for international investment and control.
Although the EU successfully negotiated the CARIFORUM
Agreement to its advantage, it argues that the CARIFORUM nations
also achieved some of their aims. First, the expiration of the Cotonou
Agreement 21  would have disrupted Caribbean exports and the
CARIFORUM nations needed to reach some form of agreement with the
EU to avoid this disruption.21 6 With no end in sight to WTO
211. See CARIFORUM EPA, supra note 190, at art. 122.
212. See id. at art. 68.
213. See id. at arts. 80 83.
214. See id. at arts. 67 68.
215. Cotonou Agreement, supra note 64.
216. See id. at art. 1; see also Overview of the Cotonou Agreement, EUROPEAN COMM'N,
http://ec.europa.eu/development/geographical/cotonouintro en.cfm ("The Cotonou Agreement is
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negotiations, the CARIFORUM nations needed to act quickly to prevent
the sudden economic turmoil that would result from the expiration of the
Cotonou Agreement. Second, although the EU service liberalization
schedules were not significantly greater than their previous negotiated
amounts, the CARIFORUM nations did receive certain concessions that
some have argued would have promoted economic growth in
CARIFORUM countries. 2 " Third, the modulated tariff liberalization
schedule allows for a gradual change in tariff schedules that avoids the
dangers of frontloading. Ambassador Errol Humphrey of the
CARIFORUM Secretariat argued that this would mean only an
additional 10.1% of tariff reduction on EU imports over the first ten
years, and that a significant number of products that receive tariff
reductions will be those that currently have "nuisance tariffs" and not
"serious revenue earners or those intended to protect emerging
industries.,, 218 Finally, the regional EPA protected the nations in the
219CARIFORUM EPA so that they could maintain their regional unity.
The EU could have easily negotiated bilateral agreements with
individual countries, setting one nation against another and allowing the
EU to fully use its negotiating strength to its advantage. However, as
Ambassador Humphrey explained, "[a] central objective of
CARIFORUM was to retain the integrity of its own regional integration
process"-a fact it made clear to the EU in negotiations.220
A. Asymmetrical Liberalization
So far this Article has discussed how the CARIFORUM EPA in
particular resulted in commitments that favored the EU at the expense of
CARIFORUM states. This is not surprising since trade liberalization
under the aegis of the Washington Consensus is asymmetrical in several
respects. Developed countries have a comparative advantage in many
areas that are opened up under regional and bilateral trade agreements-
including services, investment measures, and intellectual property
rights-while many developing countries have a comparative advantage
in agriculture, where few or no meaningful concessions are made to
the most comprehensive partnership agreement between developing countries and the EU. Since
2000, it has been the framework for the EU's relations with 79 countries from Africa, the Caribbean
and the Pacific (ACP).") (last updated Sept. 9, 2011).
217. KELSEY, supra note 72.
218. Humphrey, supra note 76, at 5.
219. Id. at 3 (preferential treatment for regional partners).
220. Id. at 5.
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developing countries in these agreements.22
Overall, developed countries enjoy superior negotiating advantages in
bilateral and regional trade agreements. For example, with respect to the
CARIFORUM EPA, the EU successfully negotiated a pro-liberalization
interpretation of Article V of GATS, which allows the formation of
regional trade agreements, greatly extending the CARIFORUM states'
exposure to international competition. On the other hand, the EU gave
"very little new liberalization beyond its already extensive GATS
commitments, especially in areas of interest to the CARIFORUM. The
result is a gross asymmetry of liberalization in the EPA in favor of the
EU.
, 2 22
Developed countries are not as concerned about asymmetrical trade
deals as developing countries. Many developed countries instead argue
that bilateral and regional agreements are models for future WTO
223negotiations. In essence, the assumption here is that these agreements
are building blocks towards what these countries would like to see at the
WTO. However, because the terms of these negotiations are often
controlled by the United States and the EU, developing countries may
not always find that their experience in bilateral and regional
negotiations with developed economies set precedent for what they can
negotiate at the multilateral level.224 As Frederick Abbott has argued, the
"most troubling aspect of the [Preferential Trade Agreement],
phenomenon is the exercise of virtually unconstrained political and
economic power by the United States and [the] EU to secure concessions
from developing (and developed) countries. 225
B. Intellectual Property Rights (JPR) and Asymmetrical Liberalization
Provisions targeting intellectual property rights represent an extreme
form of asymmetrical liberalization. The United States and the EU have
used a combination of RTAs, FTAs, and EPAs "to shape the evolution
of norms in areas such as intellectual property protection and drug
pricing where they have vital interests at stake and where their position
on issues is far different from those of the vast majority of states., 226
The WTO's TRIPS Agreement, enacted in 1994, set minimum
221. For an expanded view, see Gathii, supra note 112.
222. KELSEY, supra note 72, at 2.
223. See Global Europe Strategy, supra note 66; see also KELSEY, supra note 72.
224. See Abbott, supra note 120, at 582.
225. Id. at 583.
226. Benvenisti & Downs, supra note 132 (referring to this phenomenon as serial bilateralism).
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standards for intellectual property protection in all WTO member
nations. 22' The patent provisions of the TRIPS agreement are now
widely recognized as correlated to the unavailability of affordable
essential medicines in developing countries. 228 This is because patents
have been found to be correlated with high prices for essential medicines
making them unaffordable particularly for low-income people. WTO
members addressed this problem by negotiating the Doha Declaration on
TRIPS and Public Health and a proposed amendment. 229 Article 8 of
TRIPS provides that members may "adopt measures necessary to protect
public health and nutrition. 230 Some scholars have interpreted the
TRIPS agreement in light of this objective to protect public health,
arguing that the agreement should be construed to allow compulsory
licensing,231 parallel importation, flexibility in defining the scope of
232patentable subject matter, and an early working exception. They also
contend that the agreement should give countries discretion regarding
the extent of test data protection and the right to control anti-competitive
233practices. More definitively, the 2001 Doha Declaration on TRIPS and
Public Health explicitly recognized that the TRIPS Agreement "does not
and should not prevent Members from taking measures to protect public
health. ' ,234 These flexibilities built into the TRIPS Agreement may allow
227. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, WORLD TRADE ORG.
(Apr. 15, 1994), http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips e/t agmO_e.htm [hereinafter TRIPS
Agreement].
228. Frederick M. Abbott, The Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health:
Lighting a Dark Corner at the WTO, 5 J. INT'L ECON. L. 469 (2002); James Thuo Gathii, Rights,
Patents, Markets and the Global AIDS Pandemic, 14 FLA. J. INT'L L. 261 (2002).
229. James Thuo Gathii, The Legal Status of the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health
Under the Vienna Convention of the Laiw of Treaties, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 291, 302 (2002).
Patent protections held the potential for limiting access to medicines in a health crisis which TRIPS
was not intended to cause. Doha alleviated the concern by stating, in part "each provision of the
TRIPS Agreement shall be read in the light of the object and purpose of the Agreement as
expressed, in particular, in its objectives and principles." World Trade Org. [WTO], Declaration on
the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, at § 5(a), WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 (Nov. 14, 2001),
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto e/minist e/minOl_e/mindecl trips e.htm.
230. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 227, at art. 8.1.
231. Timothy Bazzle, Pharmacy of the Developing World: Reconciling Intellectual Property
Rights in India With the Right to Health. TRIPS, India's Patent System and Essential Medicines, 42
GEO. J. INT'L L. 785, 798 (2011) ("TRIPS's compulsory licensing scheme reflects the balance States
attempted to strike between IPR protection and the promotion of social welfare.").
232. See Charles T. Collins-Chase, The Case Against TRIPS-Plus Protection in Developing
Countries Facing AIDS Epidemics, 29 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 763, 773-74 (2008) (discussing the
framework of the TRIPS Agreement).
233. Id. at 771-75.
234. Id. at 778 (citing Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, supra note 229, at
2011]
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WTO members to find a balance between strong intellectual property
protection and the public health and welfare of their citizens.
However, the United States and the EU have used bilateral and
regional trade agreements to create even stronger intellectual property
protection than those created under the TRIPS Agreement. Because the
TRIPS Agreement only sets minimum standards for intellectual property
protection, countries are free to negotiate stronger protections through
bilateral and regional trade agreements, called TRIPS-plus provisions.235
Developing countries facing public health pandemics such as
HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis preferred not to adopt stronger
intellectual property rights protections than those required by the TRIPS
Agreement. This is because strong protections would mean having high-
cost essential medicines under patent. Stronger protections than those in
the TRIPS Agreement have been referred to as TRIPS-plus provisions.
The best example of such TRIPS-plus provisions is in the U.S.-
Morocco FTA of January 2003. Referred to as "the most advanced
[intellectual property] chapter in any FTA negotiated so far" by the U.S.
pharmaceutical industry, the U.S.-Morocco FTA has substantial
intellectual property rights provisions with regard to copyrights,
trademarks, and patents.236 The IPR provisions create strong rules for
protecting trademarks and copyrights-in particular, they specify
detailed rules regarding the protection and use of trademarks and
copyrights, protect the rights of parties involved, and require signatories
to create means of adjudicating claims. 37 The FTA also contains strong
patent provisions, especially with respect to pharmaceutical products.
For example, the FTA requires Morocco to prohibit the marketing of
pharmaceutical products that infringe patents and notify patent owners
when their patents are infringed.23 8
In addition to its FTA with Morocco, the United States has also
included TRIPS-plus provisions in its bilateral agreements with Jordan
(2000), Chile (2003), Singapore (2003), Australia (2004), and in the
235. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 227, at art. 1.1 ("Members may, but shall not be obliged
to, implement in their law more extensive protection than is required by this Agreement, provided
that such protection does not contravene the provisions of this Agreement.").
236. See FAQ: UIS-Morocco Free Trade Agreement (FTA) answer to How Does the FTA Protect
Intellectual Property Rights?, EXPORT.GOV (quotations omitted),
http://www.export.gov/faq/eg main 017504.asp (last updated Mar. 31, 2011 4:34 PM).
237. Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Morocco, art. 15.2 15.7, Jun. 15, 2004, 118 Stat. 1103,
available at
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/fta/morocco/asset upload fie797 3849.
pdf [hereinafter U.S.-Morocco FTA].
238. Id. at art. 15.11, 4.
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239
regional trade agreement CAFTA (2004). While these countries were
willing to accept TRIPS-plus provisions, the South African Customs
Union (SACU) declined to sign off on TRIPS-plus protections,
regarding them as disproportionately beneficial to the United States. 240
The SACU's resistance to concessions imposed by the United States is
discussed below in my discussion on SACU's resistance of a U.S. FTA.
C. Agriculture and Asymmetrical Liberalization
Asymmetrical liberalization is not limited to intellectual property
rights. It is also acutely demonstrated in the absence of a commitment to
liberalize agriculture in the same way liberalization in industrial
products, intellectual property rights, and services has proceeded.
Multilateral negotiations in the Doha Round have taken a back seat to
the liberalization of services and investment opportunities as well as the
strengthening of intellectual property rights protection in bilateral and
regional trade agreements. Yet liberalization in agriculture-an area in
which developing countries have a comparative advantage-has faltered.
Similarly, development concerns have not fared well in bilateral and
regional trade agreements or at the WTO, notwithstanding the fact that
the Doha Ministerial Declaration that launched the current WTO round
of negotiations in 2001 committed the members to ensuring that
development was at the heart of the new round of negotiations. The
lackluster attitude towards agricultural liberalization and development
contrasts sharply with the strong liberalization commitments made in
favor of developed countries in the areas of intellectual property rights,
services, and investment opportunities. Further, even issues of particular
importance to developing countries, such as removal of cotton subsidies
and distortions in agriculture, do not receive much attention. For
example the WTO offers developing countries aid to offset agricultural
imbalances instead of removing distortion-producing trade measures
outright.24 1
239. Collins-Chase, supra note 232, at 779.
240. See Chelsea Brown, Trade Integration and Institutional Reform in Latin America: Can
FTAA Be Revived?, 15 LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 221, 228 (2009).
241. Brazil, for example, settled for technical assistance and capacity-building assistance in the
cotton sector in Brazil worth $147 million annually as a countermeasure to settle its victory against
the United States in the WTO Appellate Body decision finding U.S. cotton subsidies to be
inconsistent with the United States' WTO obligations. See Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade
Representative, U.S., Brazil Agree on Memorandum of Understanding As Part of Path Forward
Toward Resolution of Cotton Dispute, http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-
releases/2010/april/us-brazil-agree-memorandum-understanding-part-path-f (last visited July 21,
2011).
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Another significant problem with bilateral and regional trade
agreements is that they eliminate conventional means of accommodating
countries through Special and Differential Treatment as well as the built-
in flexibilities of the multilateral trading system.242 Thus, regional and
bilateral agreements can potentially exacerbate trade distortions rather
than resolve them. For example, the subsidized U.S. agricultural market
has strong adverse effects on Chilean wheat and sugar markets.
Although the Chilean agricultural sector has gained much from fruit and
agro-industrial exports to the United States under the Chile-U.S. FTA,
highly subsidized wheat and sugar from the United States sells at low
prices, making it difficult for Chilean wheat and sugar farmers to
243
compete. This could potentially crash Chile's domestic wheat and
sugar market, resulting in substantial rural worker displacement.244 As
the Chile example illustrates, U.S. agricultural subsidies will continue to
adversely affect developing countries' access to developed countries'
markets unless the United States stops subsidizing its agricultural
industry.245
242. The Kigali Declaration on the Economic Partnership Agreement Negotiations of the African
Union's Conference of Trade Ministers (following a meeting from October 29 to November 2,
2010) resolved the "commitment to concluding development-friendly EPAs that will contribute
meaningfully to reducing and ultimately eradicating poverty in our countries. In this regard, we urge
the EU to dedicate additional, predictable and sustainable resources to specifically address EPA-
related adjustment costs and build productive capacities." The Kigali Declaration on the Economic
Partnership Agreement Negotiations of the African Union's Conference of Trade Ministers, African
Union, 3, Nov. 2, 2010,
http://www.southcentre.org/index.phpoption-com content&view-article&id 1432 /o3Asb52&cati
d= 1440 o3Asouth-bulletin-individual-articles&ltemid=287&lang=en. The Declaration further
resolved a "commitment to the proposals by the ACP Group that the objective criteria which form
part of the political objectives agreed by the international community, at the multilateral level, are
retained to determine the parameters that have to be met to enable the conclusion of the EPAs,"
implicitly referring to the need for special and differential treatment principles applicable in the
WTO to apply in EPA negotiations. Id. at 6.
243. Lindsay M. Fame, The Internationalization of Chilean Agriculture: Implications of the
United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement, 13 MiNN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 383, 400 (2004).
244. Id. at 401.
245. And no progress is being made in the multilateral negotiations, either. "The G20 was
disappointed by the fact that no progress has been achieved in discussion of the trade aspects of
cotton during the July 2008 Ministerial. The G20 was also concerned that current substantive
negotiations on cotton seemed to be deadlocked and even back-tracking in the consultations of the
Special Session on Agriculture. Developing country producers and exporters of cotton, particularly
the poorest among them, continued to face unfair competition from developed country subsidies.
The G20 urged developed countries, which accounted for the bulk of trade-distorting subsidies in
cotton to live up to the mandate." Sub-Committee on Cotton, Secretariat Progress Report:
Implementation of the Developed Assistance Aspects of the Cotton-Related Decisions in the 2004
July Package and Paragraph and Paragraph 12 of the Hong Kong Ministerial, 6, WT/CFMC/28
(2010).
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D. Is Resistance An Option?
In light of the asymmetrical liberalization in trade as demonstrated
above, the question arises: is resistance an option for developing
countries? Can developing countries say no when trade negotiations
seem to invariably favor developed countries? The next section
examines these questions.
1. The SACUExample
Even though the interests of developed countries are likely to prevail
in bilateral and regional agreements, there has been some resistance to
adopting the U.S. Model FTA. The best example of this resistance is the
case of the Southern African Customs Union. As noted earlier, the
SACU comprises Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, and
Swaziland. 246 Negotiations for the U.S.-SACU FTA were launched in
2001, but were suspended in 2004 because of "diverging views on a
number of issues., 24' The SACU rejected the one-size-fits-all approach
taken by the United States in its FTAs. 24' The United States insisted that
the SACU accept the standard U.S. Model FTA in its entirety, including
provisions on intellectual property, government procurement, and
investment. 249 The SACU argued it did not have the resources to enforce
such extensive provisions. 250 For the SACU, the United States' "golden
251Istandards of trade relations" were too onerous.
246. What isSACU?, S. AFR. CUSTOMS UNION, http://www.sacu.int (last visited July 20, 2011).
247. Trade Negotiations: Bi-lateral Trade, S. AFR. CUSTOMS UNION,
http://www.sacu.int/traden.php?id=414 (last visited Aug. 14 2011).
248. See Rodrick Mukumbira, US.-SACU Free Trade Talks Hit Snags, BILATERALS.ORG (May
15, 2006), http://www.bilaterals.org/spip.phparticle4712 ("Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia,
Swaziland, and South Africa refused to join the US free trade parade - citing flaws in the one-size-
fits-all template the US offered."); see also Statement by Ambassador Schiwab at the SACU
TIDCA Signing Ceremony, S. AFR. CUSTOMS UNION (July 16, 2008),
http://www.sacu.int/main.php?include-docs/speeches/2008/spO7l6a.html ("We have explored the
possibility of pursuing an FTA with some African partners, but at this point most countries in the
region are not yet in a position to undertake the types of commitments that would be required for a
comprehensive FTA with the United States." The Ambassador also explains the goal of the United
States, in the future, to negotiate the "Singapore Issues" with the SACU. "The ultimate goal of the
TIDCA is to provide an umbrella under which the United States and SACU will be able to negotiate
a series of trade and investment agreements or understandings on a wide range of issues, including
sanitary and phytosanitary issues, customs cooperation and trade facilitation, removing technical
barriers to trade, and investment promotion.").
249. See Mukumbira, supra note 248.
250. See id.
251. Id.
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In particular, the SACU objected to the intellectual property rules
because they would have limited compulsory licensing to governmental
non-commercial use. The SACU further objected to the five-year
minimum period of data exclusivity designed to enhance protections for
25
clinical trial dates beyond those under the TRIPS Agreement. 52 The
TRIPS-plus terms included in the FTA would have had a significant
impact on SACU members' ability to distribute essential medicines
because they would have been required to limit the use of public health
flexibilities in TRIPS.253 SACU countries cited the high prevalence of
the HIV/AIDS epidemic in the region to argue against accepting such
limitations on their ability to distribute anti-retroviral medicines at
254
affordable prices. As one scholar has noted, when comparing "the
costs of AIDS to the anticipated benefits of the FTA... the economic
and social costs outweigh the benefits, and these countries have done
well to move away from FTAs with the United States. 255 Furthermore,
South Africa objected to the investment provisions in the U.S. Model
FTA that required termination of its black empowerment program.
256
The program required investors to employ a certain percentage of black
employees as a remedy for racial discrimination under apartheid. 5 7
2. The U.S. -South Korea FTA
The U.S.-South Korea FTA represents another example of difficult
negotiations because of resistance to the terms of the agreement.
Although, as noted earlier, an FTA with South Korea was eventually
concluded, the United States had long resisted signing the FTA that was
negotiated in 2007. While the SACU case involved objections to
provisions imposed by the United States, resistance to the U.S.-South
Korea FTA came from within the United States. In particular, the U.S.
252. Brook K. Baker, Ending Drug Registration Apartheid: Taming Data Exclusivity and
Patent/Registration Linkage, 34 AM. J.L. & MED. 303, 341 (2008); see Carlos Maria Correa,
Implications of Bilateral Free Trade Agreements on Access to Medicines, 84 BULL. WHO 399,
399-401 (2006). Comprehensive coverage of issues relating to the SACU-U.S. FTA can be found
in J. CLARK LEITH & JOHN WHALLEY, INST. FOR INT'L ECON., COMPETITIVE LIBERALIZATION AND
A US-SACU FTA (May 2003), available at
www.piie.com/publications/chapters preview/375/12iie3616.pdf.
253. See Collins-Chase, supra note 232, at 798 801.
254. Alfonce Mbizwo, AIDS Drugs Dog U.S.-Southern Africa Trade Deal, BILATERALS.ORG
(Apr. 29, 2005), http://www.bilaterals.org/spip.php?article 1795.
255. Collins-Chase, supra note 232, at 801.
256. David Schneiderman, Promoting Equality, Black Economic Empowerment, and the Future
of Investment Rules, 25 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 246, 270-75 (2009).
257. Id.
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automobile and beef industries opposed the FTA because they believed
it would result in domestic job losses. 218 Environmental and labor groups
also opposed-and continue to oppose-the FTA, contending that it
does little to protect environmental and labor rights.259 Unlike the
SACU, South Korea has a trade surplus with the United States and a
significant market share in certain categories of the U.S. market,
including apparel, textiles, footwear, machinery, electronics, and
260passenger cars. In December 2010, South Korea finally made
agreeable concessions on autos and beef, paving the way to an
agreement that now remains to be ratified by the U.S. Congress and the
South Korean Parliament. Congress ratified the FTA in mid-October,
2011 and the President signed it into law on Friday, October 21,2011.261
The U.S.-South Korean FTA therefore illustrates the market power that
a country with a trade surplus vis-A-vis the United States can have in
negotiating an FTA.
CONCLUSION
This Article has analyzed the upsurge in bilateral and regional trade
agreements. It has argued that bilateral and regional trade agreements
today provide a platform for developed countries to leverage aggressive
unilateralism in trade and to enact WTO Plus obligations in areas such as
intellectual property rights, trade in services, financial liberalization
commitments, government procurement, competition, and investment
measures. As trade negotiations shift to bilateral and regional
agreements where developed countries can leverage their market power
to impose economic programs, developing countries are much more
likely to be hemmed into disadvantageous, enforceable treaty
commitments.
However, the SACU's successful resistance to a standard U.S. Model
258. See William Rogers, Unions Say Korea US Trade Pact Means Job Losses in Both Countries,
LEFT LAB. REP. (July 8, 2011), http://leftlaborreporter.wordpress.com/2011/07/08/unions-say-korea-
us-trade-pact-means-job-losses-in-both-countries.
259. See Facing KORUS in the Fight for Fair Trade, SIERRA CLUB,
http://www.sierraclub.org/trade/downloads/2011-04-korea-factsheet.pdf (last visited Oct. 8, 2011).
See Press Release, Public Citizen, Obama's Decision to Push Bush's NAFTA-Style Korea Trade
Deal Without Real Fixes Is Major Policy, Political Mistake (Dec. 3, 2010),
http://www.citizen.org/documents/obama-pushes-bad-korea-deal-statement-dec-3- I 0.pdf.
260. See Agenda 2010 U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS), AM. MANUFACTURING
TRADE ACTION COALITION, http://www.amtacdc.org/Pages/Policy-lssues.aspx#KORUS (last
visited Oct. 14, 2011).
261. See supra, note 46.
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FTA indicates that such aggressive trade unilateralism does not always
guarantee one-sided deals. Developing countries can use bilateral trade
agreements to strengthen development-friendly objectives in the
intellectual property context as well as to "reconsider the gains and
losses of the multilateral bargain. 262 Developing countries can also
move issues horizontally from one institutional domain to another-such
as from the WTO to the World Intellectual Property Organization, from
the WTO to the World Health Organization for health issues, or certainly
from bilateral or regional negotiations to the Conference of Parties of the
263Convention on Biological Diversity.
While alternative forums provide a safe place free from unilateral
pressures to discuss issues often marginalized in other international
264
settings, not all alternative forums offer opportunities for
consequential rule making. 65 Such forums do however offer these
countries opportunities to develop and generate counter-norms,266
political pressure, and the type of coalitions necessary to counter the
dominance of developed countries in bilateral and regional trade
negotiations. Yet one cannot underestimate how effectively bilateral and
regional trade agreements split heterogeneous groups of developing
countries in ways that undermine their ability to coalesce and bargain
collectively through the multilateral setting of the WTO.267
262. Okediji, supra note 123, at 145-46.
263. In October 2010, developing countries at the 2010 Conference of Parties of the Convention
on Biological Diversity in Nagoya, Japan secured an important victory over industrialized States
with a legally binding agreement to share equitably the benefits of genetic resources. References to
market based mechanisms to combat climate change favored by industrialized countries were
excluded from the meeting outcome documents which reflected the need for strong regulatory
measures favored by developing countries. See The Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic
Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising From Their Utilization to the
Convention on Biological Diversity (Oct. 29, 2010), http:/www.cbd.int/Nagoya/outcomes/; Richard
Gray, Landmark UN Nagoya Bio-Diversity Deal Agreed to Save Natural World, DAILY
TELEGRAPH (Oct. 30 2010), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/earth/earthnews/8098540/Landmark-UN-
Nagoya-biodiversity-deal-agreed-to-save-natural-world.html.
264. See Helfer, supra note 123, at 55; see also Peter Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents in the
International Intellectual Property Regime, 38 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 323, 408 16 (2004).
265. Helfer, supra note 123, at 56 57.
266. Lawrence Heifer makes an analogous point when he argues that such alternative forums
offer developing countries an opportunity "to generate the political groundwork necessary for new
rounds of intellectual property lawmaking in the WTO and WIPO." See id. at 59.
267. Indeed, as Ruth Okediji has argued, since "regime shifting upsets coalitional dynamics
between developing countries, the loss on the development side is doubled. Not only is there a
dilution of a normative proposition, however subtle, but there is also the political loss resulting from
splinters between developing countries whose membership in various regimes may be different, or
whose position on issues within the regimes may differ." Ruth L. Okediji, The International
Relations of Intellectual Property: Narratives of Developing Country Participation in the Global
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Further, bilateralism and regionalism in trade are fads that are
spreading neoliberal economic ideals to the periphery of the global
trading system. In other words, emulation by small developing countries
of neoliberal economic ideas and policies is a significant driver of
economic reform. Developing countries adopt neoliberalism not simply
because it is imposed, as many previous accounts suggest. Rather,
neoliberalism is voluntarily adopted for a variety of reasons. First, there
has been a convergence in the thinking of policymakers and academics
in developing and developed countries through education or professional
associations and contacts. Thus, developing countries are not isolated
jurisdictions shaping their trade policies independently of other
jurisdictions in developed economies. On this account, developing
countries-particularly their form of the modern state-were historically
created by similar projections of metropolitan power or mimicry of post-
colonial elites. Thus, it is difficult to sustain hard and fast boundaries
between locally produced ideas in a distinct autonomous zone and
centrally produced ideas generated under the aegis of neoliberalism that
developing countries must be protected and insulated from. Here, the
literature on the autonomy of local government from centralized or
federal decision making is very instructive. As the scholars in this area
have noted, efforts to promote local autonomy from central power are
"better understood as efforts to alter the central frameworks within
which local discretion is inevitably exercised, rather than as attempts to
substitute centralized command for local control.,,
268
Second, government officials in developing countries have adopted
neoliberal reforms because they believe that such reforms are
preconditions to achieving increased economic growth and efficiency in
the public sector. Third, officials in developing countries are
strategically adopting neoliberal reforms through bilateral and regional
trade agreements because such reforms signal that a country is "safe" for
investment. Moreover, these agreements provide budget support that is
otherwise unavailable to these developing country officials in their home
country. Fourth, officials in developing countries are often passive
Intellectual Property System, 7 SING. J. INTL & COMP. L. 315, 373 (2003); see also Benvenisti &
Downs, supra note 226, at 597, 610 (arguing that powerful regime shifting is favored by powerful
states since "they know that weaker states are not only more numerous than they are, but they are
also far more diverse with respect to size, wealth, and their level of development).
268. See David J. Barron, A Localist Critique of the New, Federalism, 51 DUKE L. J. 377, 381
(2001). This of course is not to suggest that there are no locally specific values and ideas, but rather
to argue that local ideas exist 'within a larger, coordinated structure and depend at all times upon
central law for their autonomy." Id. at 410 11; see also Gerald E. Frug & David J. Barron,
International Local Government Lan,, 38 URB. LAW. 1 (2006).
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imitators. In the absence of solid evidence as to the efficacy of neoliberal
ideals and often without having undertaken research into alternative
reform ideas, these officials rationally resort to neoliberal ideals.269
In short, this Article has argued that the increased number of regional
and bilateral trade agreements represents an important opportunity for
further diffusion of neoliberal economic ideals, an insight often missing
in leading accounts that have emphasized how this trend conforms to or
departs from the norms of the WTO. Ultimately, constructivism can
better account for the circumstances under which neoliberalism arises by
taking into consideration the context within which these ideas are
generated and perpetuated, resulting in a policy framework in which
choices favoring neoliberalism are more likely to be exercised by
developing countries.
269. David Strang & Michael Macy, In Search of Excellence: Fads, Success Stories and Adaptive
Emulation, 107 AM. J. SOC. (2001) 147, 172. Notably, Katharina Pistor argues that standardization
of the legal architecture for global markets "will accelerate the process of legal convergence with
the double benefit of reducing transaction costs for transnational investors and increasing the quality
of legal institutions in countries whose institutions are less developed." Katharina Pistor, The
Standardization of Laiw and Its Effect on Developing Economies, 50 AM. J. COM. L. 97, 97 (2002).
Pistor's point is instructive, particularly if we think of standardization of legal norms as reducing the
costs of developing country officials to investigate alternatives to neoliberal ideals or their efficacy.
All they have to do is to adopt them, within margins of discretion of course, as these ideals come to
be regarded as "best practice" or "efficient." For this reason, Pistor argues that developing country
officials come to adopt rules or laws that do not reflect their context and the efficacy of such rules is
therefore brought into question. Id. at 99.
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